



**USAID**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



# REVIEW OF FOOD FOR PEACE MARKET-BASED EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

## Nigeria Case Study Report

REPORT BY TANGO INTERNATIONAL

January 2018

**DISCLAIMER** The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government



Report prepared by William Lynch and Maryada Vallet.

The review team would like to acknowledge the assistance received from colleagues at USAID FFP and USAID Nigeria, in particular Michelle Juarez, whose time and thoughtful reflections helped make this case study possible. One of the Maiduguri-based implementing partners coordinated the review team's field visits, for which TANGO is very grateful. The team would also like to acknowledge the valuable input received from implementing partners, other donors, government representatives, the private sector, and United Nations agencies operating in Nigeria. The review team would like to thank Abba Makinta and Ya Ashe Bulama (Independent Consultants) who helped collect primary data in northern Nigeria. The case study report also benefited from inputs by Padraic Finan and Niloy Chowdhury (Research Assistants, TANGO). We would especially like to thank the generous community members and households who provided the review team insight into their experiences.

## CONTENTS

ACRONYMS	5
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM NIGERIA	6
1. INTRODUCTION	6
CASE STUDY SCOPE AND APPROACH	6
2. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF FFP MARKET-BASED FOOD ASSISTANCE IN NIGERIA	8
3. PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION	10
DESIGN DECISIONS: MODALITY CHOICE AND CHANGES, TARGETING STRATEGY	10
IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS/ISSUES: CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES	15
IP INVESTMENTS IN CAPACITY	20
FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES	21
4. COST-EFFICIENCY TRENDS	24
5. DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS	24
<b>LIFE HISTORIES</b>	26
6. RECOMMENDATIONS	26
APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES THAT SHOULD CONTINUE	26
APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES TO MODIFY	26
7. ANNEXES	28
ANNEX 1: E-VOUCHERS/ MOBILE MONEY PROVIDERS	28
ANNEX 2: SUMMARY TABLE OF FFP FUNDING IN NIGERIA, AWARDED FY2015-2016	29
ANNEX 3: REFERENCES	30
ANNEX 4: INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUPS CONDUCTED	32
ANNEX 5: APPROACH	34
ANNEX 6: LIFE HISTORY INTERVIEWS	36
ANNEX 7: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW TOOLS	40
FGD: BENEFICIARIES	40
KII: VENDORS	44
KII: PARTNERS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS	45
IDI: LIFE HISTORY INTERVIEW GUIDE	47

## List of Figures

Figure 1: FFP emergency funding (EFSP, 202(e) regular, and 202(e)-enhanced) in Nigeria, FY15-16 .....	9
Figure 2: FFP emergency funding (EFSP, 202(e) regular, and 202(e)-enhanced) awarded per modality in Nigeria, FY15-16 .....	9
Figure 3: Percent of households with poor, borderline, or acceptable food consumption scores (FCS)..	21

## List of Tables

Table 1: Example of IP selection criteria during shift from status to needs-based targeting.....	13
Table 2: Cost comparison of in-kind food aid and local purchase of commodities (USD) .....	24
Table 3: Stakeholders interviewed during the Nigeria field mission June 26-July 7, 2017 and/or via Skype prior to the field mission .....	32
Table 4: Summary data for focus groups/interviews conducted in Nigeria: locations and number and type of participants .....	33

## List of Life Histories

Life History 1: Fatima.....	23
Life History 2: Aisha.....	36
Life History 3: Ahmed .....	37
Life History 4: Ibrahim.....	38

## ACRONYMS

APS	Annual Program Statement
CaLP	The Cash Learning Partnership
CFW	Cash for Work
CT	Cash Transfer
CSI	Coping Strategies Index
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department
EFSP	Emergency Food Security Program
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFP	Food for Peace
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FV	Food Voucher
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GoN	Government of Nigeria
HH	Household
IDI	In-Depth Interview
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IP	Implementing Partner
KII	Key Informant Interview
LRP	Local and Regional Purchase (of food)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDR	Minimum Daily Requirement
MT	Metric Tons
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGN	Nigerian Naira
NGO	Non-Government Organization
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
RUTF	Ready-to-Use-Therapeutic-Food
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
(S)GBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
TANGO	Technical Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations, International
UCT	Unconditional Cash Transfer
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM NIGERIA

**Nigeria** is an example of food assistance in a conflict situation in the Sahelian context. The response used information technology to deliver one of the more sophisticated applications of voucher programs. This case is a good example of proactive implementing partner (IP) mechanisms and monitoring systems to help detect and prevent fraud in a highly insecure context. It also demonstrates how humanitarian actors shifted modalities in response to the dynamic security and market conditions. The early response primarily provided in-kind food to newly accessible communities, and as the markets began functioning again, Food for Peace (FFP) saw the opportunity to transition to market-based assistance. Urban areas with functioning markets used e-vouchers, some with biometrics and technologies that provided efficiencies for beneficiaries and IPs, such as including “wallets” in the voucher that could be used for cash or non-food items. In some areas with functioning markets IPs chose to use mobile money due to ongoing insecurity in surrounding areas. This case also illustrates a high degree of collaboration between FFP, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and IPs.

## I. INTRODUCTION

### CASE STUDY SCOPE AND APPROACH

This report is one of seven case studies conducted under a global review of Food for Peace (FFP) market based emergency programs (MBEP) that received Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) or Title II 202(e)-enhanced funding between FY 2010 and 2016. This case study provides information about the global review’s four main objectives: (1) establish a historical narrative about FFP market-based emergency food assistance programming between 2010 and 2016, (2) review program design and implementation processes, (3) analyze program cost-efficiency trends across a range of variables, and (4) identify developmental impacts of the projects on local economies and market actors.

The global review<sup>1</sup> is based on: FFP’s guidance and award documents and partner reports; field visits to seven countries specified by FFP; and data, documentation and information provided by FFP, implementing partners (IPs), key informants, and program beneficiaries. A consistent methodology was used across cases to allow for comparison and aggregation of findings for the Global Report. The review is intended to gather lessons learned that focus on how FFP, as a unique actor and the largest international food assistance donor, has evolved to address food security in crisis contexts. This report concludes with recommendations for FFP about good practices and approaches to continue, and those that FFP should consider modifying.

Field work was conducted in Nigeria from June 28 to July 6, 2017. Northeast Nigeria at the time of this study was a highly insecure environment. The study team adhered to IP security protocols. This limited site visits to internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and vendors. Interviews could last no more than

---

<sup>1</sup> A review differs from a program evaluation or audit in that it is a broad assessment of program performance, process, and operational issues. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines a “review” as “distinct from evaluation and more closely associated with monitoring. They are periodic or ad hoc, often light assessments of the performance of an initiative and do not apply the due process of evaluation or rigor in methodology” (UNDP 2009).



an hour in any one location and all visits were conducted during daylight hours. The team was restricted in its fieldwork to secure areas of Maiduguri where four non-governmental organization (NGO) IPs were implementing EFSP. The sample from Maiduguri is representative of most of the conflict's IDP population, yet it does not include the smaller and rural response areas. To address this constraint, the study sought perspectives from IPs and other key informants on programming outside of the fieldwork area. While vendors and IDPs were interviewed, due to security and time constraints, the host communities were not interviewed. The review team conducted in-person key informant interviews (KIIs) where possible; given security concerns and logistical constraints, the review team conducted some interviews remotely via Skype. In total, the study included: 100 beneficiary focus group participants (52 male/ 48 female); 36 KII such as with FFP, IP staff, government, other donors, et al; six vendor interviews; and four in-depth life history interviews (IDI). For further details, see Annexes 4 and 5, and the qualitative topical outlines in Annex 7.

## COUNTRY CONTEXT

Nigeria is a West African country with a population of 186 million. It is an oil exporter and net food importer. The decline of oil prices has strained the economy, resulting in devaluation of the local currency (Naira) and increased food costs. Since 2009, a Boko Haram insurgency aligned with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria has convulsed the three states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in the northeast with refugee flows and unrest spilling into Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. An estimated 15,000-20,000 people have been killed, and 1.9 million are displaced. Over one million former IDPs and refugees have returned to their homes. Many of these people are in areas accessible to humanitarian support.

In May 2013, the Government of Nigeria (GoN) declared a state of emergency and began shipping cereals from the government grain reserve to people in need. The 2015 National Nutrition and Health Survey found that the prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) among children under-five nationally were 7.2 percent and 1.8 percent respectively (National Bureau of Statistics 2015). Acute malnutrition was highest in the northwest (10.2 percent) and northeast (9.5 percent). A rapid assessment in 2015 by Partner <sup>12</sup> found diet diversity scores of only 1.7 food groups out of an acceptable score of 5 in conflict-affected areas. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) data indicated crisis and emergency levels of food insecurity (Integrated Phase Classification 3 and 4) in conflict affected zones, and in December 2016, FEWS NET reported that a famine may have occurred (FEWS NET 2016).

**MARKET FUNCTIONING:** Market activity in northeast Nigeria has been limited across much of Borno and Yobe States due to military and insurgent activities, including suicide attacks in markets (WFP 2016b). Reduced crop production in recent years, combined with increased transportation costs, fuel shortages, and depreciation of the Nigerian Naira, have contributed to increased food costs, such as for the staple foods maize, local rice, and palm oil in early 2016 (WFP 2016a). Food prices continued to increase through 2016 and into 2017 – with some increases as much as 40 percent – while labor wages remained flat (WFP 2016b, 2016c, 2017a). As of early 2017, most northeast Nigerian markets were accessible again with the exception of two markets in each of Yobe and Borno States still closed due to insecurity (WFP 2017a, 2017b). Maize markets are well integrated, as evidenced by consistent prices in most locations, while markets for other commodities (e.g., cowpeas, groundnuts, local rice) are less well integrated (WFP 2017b). An estimated 80 percent of IDPs currently reside in urban and peri-urban

---

<sup>2</sup> Seven IPs in Nigeria received funding during the review period. IPs' identities are withheld for safety and security reasons.

areas where markets are functioning and offer a diverse range of goods including fresh and packaged foods sold from wooded stalls and concrete block stores. Often multiple stores, stalls, and warehouses are owned by single extended families.

The urban area of Maiduguri is a market, education, and administrative hub of agricultural Borno State. Approximately 1.4 million of the estimated 1.9 million IDPs reside in Maiduguri, living in camps or with host families. The fieldwork for this case study centered in Maiduguri, which is representative of most of the IDP population. Retail markets in Maiduguri re-opened in mid-2015 following sporadic fighting between Boko Haram and the Nigerian military and widespread insecurity in the city. Maiduguri has more than 20 markets—some specialized such as for cattle and vegetables—and other retail outlets outside of markets. Prices are largely set by traders’ associations in the individual markets, although some markets allow prices to float. The Maiduguri markets operate largely on cash terms at both retail and wholesale levels.

FFP is one of several donors in Nigeria supporting market-based emergency programming. At the time FFP began operations, donors, most notably, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and the European Commission Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), were funding market-based food security programs with some of the same partners that FFP would eventually use. DFID and ECHO funded cash transfer programs for the response. IPs use local and regional purchase (LRP), e-vouchers, and mobile money platforms from commercial sources, while Partner 7 uses a proprietary tool for its mobile money platform. Each of these programs uses existing markets and vendors.

## **2. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF FFP MARKET-BASED FOOD ASSISTANCE IN NIGERIA**


**FOOD FOR PEACE ROLE IN NIGERIA:** The U.S. government has supported humanitarian programs in Nigeria since 2014 through FFP, the State Department, and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funding (USAID 2015). In 2014, FFP contributed \$4 million to a program distributing locally and regionally purchased (LRP) food.<sup>3</sup> In response to increasing conflict and large-scale displacement, USAID and other donors increased contributions to programs in northeastern Nigeria (USAID 2017). FFP scaled up to \$17.8 million in FY2015 and \$58.8 million in FY2016 via EFSP funding and to a lesser extent, Title II 202(e) and 202(e)-enhanced (shown as “-enh” in the figures below) funds (Figure 1).

---

<sup>3</sup> This information about a \$4 million FFP award for LRP in FY 2014 appears in the USAID 2015 factsheet but not in the FFP funding trackers used to create Figure 1.



Figure 1: FFP emergency funding (EFSP, 202(e) regular, and 202(e)-enhanced) in Nigeria, FY15-16




Source: FFP funding trackers

Modalities diversified to include U.S.-sourced Title II in-kind aid and market-based emergency programming such as cash transfers, LRP, and food vouchers (Figure 2) (USAID 2015 and FFP documents). The largest portion of FFP funding, \$38.2 million, was awarded to voucher-based programs, followed by cash transfers and LRP. With 202(e) funds, FFP provided 1,510 metric tons (MT) of ready-to-use-therapeutic-food (RUTF) to Partner 6 to treat severely acutely malnourished children. Partner 6 is the main provider of RUTF in the emergency, and FFP’s contribution helps to ensure Partner 6 can supply RUTF to its partners.

While the scope of this study does not include funding results for FY2017,<sup>4</sup> it should be noted that FFP’s total expected contribution for 2017 increased significantly to over \$250 million (USAID 2017). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)’s Nigeria 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan appeal is for \$1.1 billion. As of November 2, 2017, the plan was 66 percent funded, and the U.S. government as the largest donor has contributed \$262.5 million or about 38 percent of funds raised (FTS N.d.). Unlike many donors to the appeal, the U.S. government channels its aid through numerous multilateral and private voluntary organizations.

Figure 2: FFP emergency funding (EFSP, 202(e) regular, and 202(e)-enhanced) awarded per modality in Nigeria, FY15-16



Source: FFP funding trackers

<sup>4</sup> FFP funding data for this study includes EFSP, 202(e) regular, and 202(e)-enhanced for FY2010-FY2016.

### 3. PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

#### DESIGN DECISIONS: MODALITY CHOICE AND CHANGES, TARGETING STRATEGY

**MODALITIES CHOICE:** Although probably significant, it cannot be quantified how much modality choice was influenced by the Annual Program Statement (APS) and the increasing capacity and preference of both IPs and donors to provide food security assistance through market-based approaches. It is also significant that in spite of the protracted nature of the emergency, a quantitative market study similar to a Bellmon Analysis was not conducted on behalf of FFP by the IPs. Instead, a series of rapid and qualitative assessments, often using small samples, were used to support program modality selection. In spite of these factors, IPs, FFP, and IP-organized beneficiary focus groups all evinced confidence to the study team that the modalities selected were effective.

FFP emergency food assistance programming in northern Nigeria has supported a variety of market based modalities, including vouchers, LRP, unconditional cash transfers (UCT), complementary services, and other activities. FFP and IP interviews and design documents describe how, overall, the modality used was determined by four main factors: donor intent, the food insecurity situation, the functionality of markets, and the local security situation.

Prior to this program, FFP did not have a history of supporting market-based emergency programming in Nigeria. FFP explained that early in this response the humanitarian actors on the frontlines (e.g., International Committee of the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and Partner 7) were primarily providing in-kind commodities to newly-accessible communities. FFP saw the opportunity to fill the gap in supporting those communities once the frontline actors moved on by quickly transitioning to market-based assistance. FFP in Abuja told the study team that it decided to use market-based approaches because of perceived timeliness and cost-efficiency. FFP compared the cost of in-kind food aid from the United States to LRP during the program design phase (see table in section 4). FFP provided strategic leadership to IPs in starting up the programs. FFP said they favored the voucher modality over cash because of the security risks in delivering cash.

FFP intentionally started small with the first programs and assessed the capacity of the IPs based on their performance and response strategy before supporting the scale up of each IP's program. FFP partners at the time of the field visit included five international NGOs and two UN agencies<sup>5</sup> operating in the northern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa (see Annex 2: for a summary of FFP-funded emergency food security programs).

Partner 1 was an early FFP awardee, in late 2014, and started with a flexible voucher approach that gave beneficiaries the choice to use either the food or cash value. Partner 1 entered Phase II of their program in FY2016 with more of a focus on food vouchers (FV) and some local procurement. Partner 4 was also awarded a program in late 2014 that included paper FVs (Part I) and cash for work (CFW) (Part II). Partner 4 received a second award in FY2016 for an expanded program with a voucher that contained a food value and a small cash transfer. In the third quarter of FY2015, Partners 2 and 3 were funded by FFP to begin food voucher programs. A year later Partner 2 received an award to expand into another geographic area, adding a small cash transfer and wallets to their voucher. In late 2016, Partner 3 began a second program that primarily involved cash transfers via mobile service provider. Partner 5 was

---

<sup>5</sup> The sixth NGO, *Première Urgence Internationale* leading a consortium, was awarded 1 June 2017 (FY2017), which is outside the scope of this review.

awarded an FV program in June 2016. The rationale for the modalities of these programs is further discussed below.

Partner 7 initially distributed in-kind food aid as dry rations in insecure, conflict affected areas where markets do not function. Partner 7 has shifted over time to LRP due to logistics issues and because LRP was found to be more timely and cost effective (see section 4 Cost-Efficiency Trends). As explained in interviews with supply chain personnel at Partner 7, in 2015 Partner 7 was using international in-kind food aid (not from the United States) but encountered constraints that interrupted pipelines. Frequent delays and pipeline breaks with in-kind aid, attributed to the timeliness and shortfalls of funding and to congestion at the ports, made it impossible to pre-position and to plan. In 2016, Partner 7 used corporate resources to set up a distribution hub in a nearby northern region, Kano, and can now make large scale grain and pulse purchases on the open market. Partner 7 uses LRP to fill gaps in the imported food pipeline and significantly reduce lead times and costs of providing food. Partner 7 reported that lead times have been reduced from eight weeks for internationally-sourced food to two weeks for LRP. As discussed further below and according to 2017 program documents, Partner 7 is scaling up cash-based programming with the intent to shift more areas from in-kind to cash or voucher modalities.

At the time of the study, four of the five NGO IPs were implementing voucher programs rather than UCTs to provide emergency food assistance to affected populations, reasoning that food insecurity was very high and food vouchers would better ensure that beneficiaries access adequate food. During interviews, a few IPs also assessed that vouchers were less likely to cause intra-household tensions or community conflict than UCT. The team observed that vouchers are accepted by an increasingly large network of market level vendors in urban Maiduguri. Initially, some IPs used paper vouchers, with or without beneficiary photos, which were vulnerable to fraud, such as sale or transfer to another person or beneficiaries registering more than once. After the first months of distributions and the expansion of EFSP to more beneficiaries and IPs, e-vouchers were introduced. Some IPs are moving to design and provide e-voucher wallets funded by multiple donors to include value for food vouchers as well as some cash for non-food items (NFIs), seeds, tools, water, transportation, and discretionary uses such as rent and medical needs. FFP works with its IPs to ensure they are meeting 50-75 percent of minimum daily requirements (MDRs).

This study did not determine what, if any, influence IPs' prior relationships with mobile money and voucher service providers had on the actual selection of a modality. Each IP made a strong case to FFP in their funding requests and to the review team for the use of an electronic transfer. Several IPs have large international service contracts with for-profit service providers (see Annex 1), which, according to KILs with the IPs, influenced their choice of provider. Examples include Partners 3 and 7 with Airtel, and Partner 5 with Segovia. The study found no indication that these contractual relationships influenced the choice of modality. For example, Partner 2, which has a contract with Red Rose and uses the platform in multiple countries, compared banks, mobile money, and remittance agencies (e.g., Western Union) with e-voucher providers and found that e-vouchers were the cheapest, safest, and easiest to scale up modality. Others, such as Partner 4, initially provided paper vouchers and then switched to smart cards, or e-vouchers.

Partners 3 and 7 delivered UCTs using mobile money with Airtel based on their organizations' internal policies with that provider, but found that Airtel had a great deal of difficulty fielding mobile money teams. As a result, beneficiaries had difficulty monetizing their SIM cards (see Logistics section below). Partner 3 chose the UCT modality in Borno State using Airtel cash agents because they had previously implemented a FFP-funded food voucher program in another northern state. Based on their experience

with that program, Partner 3 chose UCT for their subsequent program for two main reasons: security and market functioning. The main roads leading to their target areas faced ambushes by Boko Haram, so a voucher program relying on just a few major vendors with large truckloads of food would mean their food pipeline could easily be disrupted. However, Partner 3's market assessment that was published in 2016 showed that the market was functioning through small and medium vendors, who lacked the size and sophistication such as bank access and inventory to act as retailers in a voucher based program. According to Partner 3, the UCTs disbursed via cash agents and mobile money was discreet enough in this fragile security context so as not to endanger cash agents, vendors, and beneficiaries.

WFP also implemented both vouchers and UCT. In KIs, WFP staff explained that they used various assessments, e.g., market and nutrition assessments and their Omega tool, to conclude that UCT was the most efficient and effective modality to provide to large numbers of IDPs particularly in urban/peri-urban centers where mobile network coverage was adequate.<sup>6</sup> Another factor weighing in on their decision to use mobile money was WFP's global agreement already in place with Airtel.

In all, the study finds the three primary modalities, LRP, food vouchers, and UCTs have been appropriate; the fourth modality, Title II in-kind imports, is less appropriate except in specific contexts where there are no functioning markets and where local or regional commodity purchases are not viable. In a dynamic context where the frontlines are rapidly changing, pre-positioned LRP distributions were preferable to internationally-sourced in-kind aid, given the challenges of maintaining a food import pipeline. Where the local food markets are functioning, IPs and beneficiaries were of the opinion that cash/food vouchers are superior to in-kind food distribution. UCTs are particularly relevant where it is risky to rely on a few major voucher vendors, and UCT supports small/female vendors, yet it may be more likely to cause intra-household (i.e., where the female head is recipient) and community tensions. A synopsis of the appropriateness of these modalities in this context is listed below:

- **LRP:** Appropriate on the frontlines when the accessible population is rapidly changing, the food security situation is urgent, and markets are not functioning. When the local security situation has stabilized and markets are recovering, IPs should consider transitioning to FV or UCTs.
- **FV:** Appropriate to ensure the assistance is used to provide adequate food for the target household where food insecurity is high and household dietary diversity is low. Appropriate for delivering integrated assistance through "wallets" such as for water or other sectoral needs. Appropriate where vendors have the capacity and business capital to implement the program. Perceived by FFP, some IPs, and some beneficiaries as more secure than direct cash.
- **UCT:** Appropriate where the security situation necessitates a diffuse pool of participating vendors. Appropriate for supporting small and female vendors. May exacerbate intra-household or community tensions. Given the differing perspectives on the benefits and risks of UCT versus FV, this topic should be more fully explored by FFP and IPs.

**TARGETING:** According to KIs and IP project proposal documents, targeting of households affected by conflict was based on accessibility and vulnerability. Households within conflict areas were inaccessible to the IPs due to insecurity and GoN restrictions. The geographic targeting prioritized assistance to locations that were conflict-affected yet also accessible to humanitarian actors (e.g., communities made

---

<sup>6</sup> The study team requested this analysis but it was not able to be shared for this review.

accessible by the military, or returnees to their communities) and/or had populations of accessible displaced, conflict-affected persons, and host families.

The targeting criteria at the household level were based on nutrition and other vulnerability criteria, as agreed between FFP and each IP. Although these criteria were not harmonized across IPs, the IPs used similar household-level food security indicators in their criteria including dietary diversity scores, food consumption recall, and coping strategies. Further criteria identified vulnerable groups such as female, disabled, or child-headed household, the presence of infants and young children and pregnant and lactating women (PLW) in the household were used to select recipients from among populations that were overwhelmingly in need. FFP officers recalled that IPs were instructed to use status-based (i.e., IDP or host) targeting while they were also encouraged to reach the most vulnerable households.

A challenge confronting IPs has been selecting beneficiaries with the most severe needs, when there is little differentiation among individual households. This led IPs to revise and raise selection criteria thresholds. These revisions resulted in changes to the beneficiary rosters that were apparently not fully understood by beneficiaries. When asked if they knew why they were selected to receive the assistance, beneficiaries within all eight focus group discussions (FGDs) in Maiduguri believed that it was a combination of God’s will and luck that they were selected to receive aid. FGDs also noted exclusion, not inclusion error: fraudulent registration was not a problem, but targeting missed too many equally needy IDPs. During FY17, IPs were expanding their coverage and shifting from status-based to needs-based targeting. Table I below provides an example of the changes in household vulnerability selection criteria employed by Partner I, as documented in 2016 program documents.

Table I: Example of IP selection criteria during shift from status to needs-based targeting

Existing vulnerability selection criteria:	New selection criteria added:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Head of household (HHH) vulnerability (including single adult-headed since both single men and women are vulnerable, child-headed, persons with disability, or chronically ill-headed HH, and PLW-headed)</li> <li>• HH dependency ratio- to account for number of inactive HH members, including children, disabled, and elderly</li> <li>• Productive income</li> <li>• Debt level</li> <li>• HH hunger scale</li> <li>• Food consumption score</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Members in HH with malnutrition</li> <li>• Water access</li> <li>• Protection issues that include HHs with members traumatized from being harmed by the conflict through physical risks or sexual/gender-based violence (SGBV)</li> </ul>

IP proposals also explain how they planned to coordinate targeting, where possible and appropriate, across their donor projects in order to provide target households with more integrated and multi-sectoral assistance. For instance, Partner I’s 2016 program documents indicate that food insecure and SAM-identified persons from other Partner I projects were referred to their EFSP intervention to address their needs.

**ASSESSMENTS CONDUCTED:** The design-stage assessments available to the study team indicate that the primary concern was ascertaining needs rather than market dynamics. Proposals to FFP referenced external food security assessments and consultations with peer agencies demonstrating the acute food

insecurity as a result of the ongoing conflict. IPs drew from FEWS NET, OCHA, INGO Forum, and the inter-agency Food Security Thematic Group Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) survey.

While there were no Bellmon analyses required to be conducted by IPs in their modality decision making, the APS suggests using methodologies such as Rapid Assessment of Markets (known as RAM) or Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA). Each IP qualitatively assessed overall security and market functioning through rapid assessments using small samples of market price comparisons, FGDs, and KIIs, coupled with secondary sources. Given the urgency of the food security situation among the conflict-affected and the small size of the initial awards relative to need, the initial assessments appear to have been adequate. The study team doubts that the initial assessments will be sufficient to support modality choice within an even larger-scale protracted emergency.

Based on IP rapid assessments, the size of cash/voucher transfers into markets and LRPs were determined by IPs to not be significant enough to distort markets and that the size and scope of these interventions would not cause harm because of host community targeting, needs-based targeting, and the use of locally-grown and familiar commodities. FEWS NET reported anecdotally that vouchers temporarily (approximately two weeks) inflated local market prices between 1-5 percent. FFP, IPs, and KIIs each attributed large price increases to the collapse of the Naira and the imposition of import tariffs on rice. FEWS NET opined that the response programs were too small to distort markets and that the new tariff, changing consumption patterns, and collapse of the Naira were causing commodity price increases.

Both the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) and FEWS NET described the limitations of the national market data, which may have limited the ability to make informed program design choices. They noted that there was no system to aggregate and share data among humanitarian actors. FEWS NET has observed inconsistencies and quality issues in local market data collected by NGOs. NGOs, for their part, were using their own assessment designs that appeared to be designed in house. CaLP lamented that in the absence of a cluster mechanism, there had been little formal coordination or quality control among assessments. FEWS NET reported being asked by FFP to train IPs in a standard methodology, but this had not been followed through at the time of the study.

**CHANGES MADE DURING PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION:** The study team finds that IPs have been flexible in their approaches to effectively address food security needs in a changing context, including changing aspects such as modality type, delivery mechanism, and transfer value. The key to this flexibility to shift modalities to meet needs was that it was promoted by FFP. Where markets were functioning, for example, Partner 1 moved from in-kind distributions to e-vouchers in some communities, and Partner 7 moved from in-kind to vouchers or UCT. Partner 4 moved from paper vouchers to e-vouchers, and shifted some beneficiary groups to conditional transfers such as CFW while maintaining unconditional transfers for other groups. CFW activities were small-scale at the time of this study and aimed at restoring host community assets that were heavily utilized by IDPs such as schools; the target CFW beneficiaries were both IDPs and host communities. One IP switched service providers to improve voucher delivery. Across IPs, the value of food vouchers have been increased to respond to market prices and to account for larger-than-planned households. Where family sizes vary substantially, household vouchers are being replaced with per capita vouchers. Partner 2 created “wallets” within the e-voucher (i.e., cash to be spent on specific commodity types). These included a “high-nutrient wallet” for protein, and in IDP camps without adequate water, a “water wallet” was added. Several IPs started augmenting food vouchers with cash to foster greater independence and potential for income generating



activities and early recovery. This flexibility, however, required numerous modifications to the projects that entailed a lot of paperwork. FFP in Abuja said it used pre-award letters to help ensure that the modification approval process (of one to three months) would not interrupt the project activities.

## **IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS/ISSUES: CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES**

**PROCUREMENT:** Since 2015, Partner 7 has been a bulk purchaser in a challenging commodities market. Nigeria operates on a cash and carry basis, and it took time for suppliers to warm to selling on Partner 7's credit terms. Partner 7 had to learn the local market. Partner 7 purchases are not large enough to distort commodity prices since Partner 7 is in the market with other large-scale commodity buyers such as mills, breweries, Unilever, and Nestle. The most recent Partner 7 procurement at the time of this study was 30,000 MT of sorghum and 10,000 MT of beans over three months, according to Partner 7's donor presentation in June 2017. Locally procured commodities from other areas of Nigeria are pre-positioned in the Kano depot. FEWS NET corroborated Partner 7's analysis that LRP was not causing a problem in the markets, explaining that regional markets in proximity to the northeast have sufficient stock for LRP demand. Partner 7 did have to strengthen the quality of food testing labs to implement LRP (discussed more in the IP investments in capacity section below). Partner 7 said their smaller local procurements went smoothly and found the labs to be adequate for its LRP.

**GOVERNMENT POLICY:** The GoN declared emergencies in 2013 and 2016 but does not allow a UN-led OCHA coordinated Cluster System. As a work-around, IPs are members of sector working groups that function similarly to clusters. Work visas for relief staff are often delayed.

As discussed below in "Logistics," clearing and forwarding food through Lagos port would have significantly delayed Partner 7 cargoes. A 50 percent tariff was added to the 10 percent import duty on commercial imports of rice. This has driven up the price of rice but also stimulated local production.

**ACCESS/SECURITY:** Most of the nearly two million IDPs live in areas accessible to humanitarian actors. GoN counterinsurgency strategies force residents of conflict-affected areas into camps, ban fishing, and restrict farmers from growing field crops such as sorghum and maize. The GoN restricts humanitarian access to areas. For example, one key informant estimated 80 percent of the land area of Borno State was off limits to humanitarian actors, making it impossible to assess the status or continued existence of populations. According to KII, the GoN is interring residents in "safe spot" camps within Boko Haram controlled areas, building the camps in cleared areas and surrounding them with a military barrier. The camps are reportedly poorly designed and generally less accessible due to security measures and the real threat of convoy ambush. The review team did not visit these camps due to security concerns.

**CAPACITY:** FFP assessed the capacity of each applicant to carry out market-based emergency programming in Nigeria. Each IP has a humanitarian response mandate and decades of experience implementing emergency food security responses. To support the assessment and start-up of voucher/cash, in-kind, and LRP distributions in Nigeria, each IP sent expert staff to Nigeria. However, a major issue has been the inability of IPs to station long-term staff, both local and international, in conflict-affected areas. Experienced emergency response staff, especially project managers, with the local language and context knowledge are difficult to recruit and retain. Nigeria has not had large-scale emergencies in recent years, so there are few experienced local emergency response staff. There is also a language barrier between where emergency programming is being implemented in the northeast and the southern and central parts of the country where IP staff are drawn. FFP initially relied on a revolving roster of OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) experts on temporary duty.

**RISK ASSESSMENT/WASTE/FRAUD:** IPs and recipients within each focus group agreed that vouchers for food and cash reduced the risk of waste, fraud, and theft of aid. IPs periodically verify beneficiary registration lists. Measures used by IPs that reduce fraud include: checking and cleaning beneficiary lists to eliminate duplication; using beneficiary personal identification numbers (PINs) and biometrics (e.g., right thumb prints); inclusion of the name of next of kin; and voucher cards with a photograph of the recipient's face.

The IPs station staff in vendor stalls and alongside cash agents to ensure vouchers are redeemed correctly. When beneficiaries redeem their voucher for food basket items, updates are recorded in the e-voucher system and available for cross checking. There are isolated cases of vendors and IP field staff taking bribes. These cases were reported by beneficiaries through the IP complaint and feedback hotlines, and the offending vendors' contracts were terminated. There is no system to prevent or detect when beneficiaries register for food assistance from more than one IP. Some IPs are not comfortable with sharing beneficiary list details.

**RECIPIENT PREFERENCE:** Due to the security situation (i.e., a no-go zone for FFP staff), the study team had to rely on the IPs to access beneficiary populations. Focus group locations were selected from accessible options provided by the IPs, and it appeared that the focus group participants were both pre-selected and spontaneous participants who joined the discussions. It should be noted that northeastern Nigeria was not a context for humanitarian assistance prior to this crisis, so the beneficiaries were not accustomed to receiving various types of aid. In addition, the focus group participants had endured months of displacement without food assistance. At the time of this study, FGD participants tended to prefer what they had already received. IP staff explained that beneficiaries consistently report during routine monitoring that adding cash to the voucher is highly desired and they want more of it, but that overall, people were happy with whatever support they received be it in-kind, cash, or vouchers. Among those who had already received mixed-modality transfers of a cash and food voucher and those who had only received the food voucher, the majority preferred a mixed cash and food voucher. The cash was preferred as a complement to, or in tandem with, food vouchers. The food vouchers were seen as a safe and secure food resource that covered core needs, while the cash voucher was seen as a means of adding discretionary items to the household's consumption.

The 100 male and female FGD participants (all beneficiaries of voucher programs when polled during FGDs) unanimously said they preferred vouchers over cash-only or in-kind. Despite the obvious bias in group polling, follow up questions and responses consistently supported the group sentiment of vouchers' superior security, convenience, flexibility, and reduced chances of diversion to other uses. The relative value of cash versus food vouchers was a moot point because both were regularly revised to reflect the value of a household ration delivering a determined percentage of nutrition requirements (50-75 percent of MDR). Beneficiaries and IP staff said vouchers eliminate over-crowding at distribution sites because the recipients could decide when to pick up their ration as opposed to lining up at a specific time to collect a ration. Moreover, beneficiary focus groups and interviews with IPs agreed that vouchers for food and cash were a safer and more dignified way to receive aid. An often-repeated comment from beneficiaries was that with vouchers, only they and God knew when they were going to the vendor. Beneficiary responses highlighted confidentiality and convenience as keys to their improved sense of security. Other advantages of vouchers cited by stakeholders include e-voucher cards additionally function as ID cards, and vouchers eliminate the risk of aid convoy losses due to theft, accident, or ambush.

The voucher modality is preferred overall by the men and women interviewed for the reasons listed above. For some beneficiaries, another reason the voucher modality is preferred over UCT is because of the issue of men being more likely to control cash and to use the cash for other purposes. Men of one FGD said if they received cash they would be tempted to use it for other needs besides food. Two of the women's FGDs echoed a similar sentiment that they preferred the voucher card because they can ensure the food will be used to feed their families, whereas if cash is given, the men may give some to his other wives. This issue of polygamy has been considered by some of the IPs in their distribution approach. This is further discussed in the section on Gender/Protection.

**LESSONS LEARNED/MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E):** IPs have monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning systems that include feedback and complaint response mechanisms, distribution monitoring, post-distribution monitoring (PDM), and baseline and endline surveys. The complaints mechanisms are promoted at distribution sites and in some cases written on the e-voucher card. IPs provide multiple mechanisms for providing feedback: hotline numbers, complaints boxes, and a staffed help desk.

IPs monitor distributions to manage queues at vendor locations and to ensure that transfers were made on time and service provider equipment was functioning. Price monitoring was conducted to ensure vendors were not increasing prices. All IPs conducted PDM among a sample of beneficiaries to assess trends in the reported use of food and cash and beneficiary satisfaction with transfer delivery and value. IPs also use PDM to identify and address challenges that arise during project implementation. Some IPs recorded food security indicators such as household dietary diversity score and coping strategies index (CSI) during PDM, but this was not done consistently across IPs. Four of the five IPs track the Household Hunger Scale and CSI at baseline and endline. Additional indicators measured at baseline and endline varied by IP and include the Food Consumption Score (FCS) and Women's Dietary Diversity Score. Food security indicators collected vary across IPs; a common set of indicators will be required by FFP in 2017 (discussed further in the Food security outcomes section below).

The continual addition of new beneficiaries and expansion into new communities means that M&E plans must adjust to a moving and changing beneficiary group. IPs with beneficiary populations that change in size and composition are challenged to collect follow-up data that reflect food security changes before beneficiaries leave the program area. The study finds that guidance is needed from FFP regarding this M&E challenge.

Nonetheless, IPs have attempted to use the most robust methods possible when conducting surveys, such as using simple random sampling and using programmed smartphones to collect the data. They also ensured adequate enumerator training, emphasizing context sensitivities and the need for high-quality translation of questionnaires into local languages (e.g., Kanuri, Hausa, Shuwa).

**LOGISTICS:** The Port of Lagos is congested, which contributes to delays in clearing and forwarding goods. Moreover, the port is located in the southwest corner of the country, which is rather far, 1,706 km, from Maiduguri in the northeast, presenting a significant overland transportation cost and increased exposure to theft and bad weather (e.g., rain). Partners 6 and 7 are eligible to receive duty free import of goods through the port; other IPs are not.

E-voucher service companies provide point of sale biometric scanners, blue tooth receipt printers, card readers, and power packs, which function like batteries. This hardware is augmented with technical support provided by trained IP staff and through remote assistance. For the most part, beneficiaries, vendors and IPs are satisfied with the support. UCTs through SIM cards (e.g., via Airtel) have proven

problematic because sometimes Airtel agents are not at distribution points with adequate cash for beneficiaries. This problem is limited to one company, Airtel. Other NGOs distributing cash through other donor programs have had similar issues with Airtel. The NGO IP using Airtel for the FFP program reports they hope to find a service provider with cash agents as an alternative to Airtel for future phases of the program.

**GENDER AND PROTECTION:** According to International Organization on Migration (IOM 2016), the IDP population is comprised of 54 percent females. Discussions with IPs and beneficiaries did not conclusively explain the gender imbalance among IDPs. Descriptions of Boko Haram abducting young men and boys were counter-balanced by interviews with women supporting widespread reports of girls and young women being abducted. The study team declines to speculate on this demographic imbalance.

The study team finds that gender dynamics in households, particularly on decision making around resources, have been considered by IPs on an ad hoc basis during implementation. The study team found scant evidence in program design documents of thorough gender analysis at the outset of the programs. IPs attempted to address gender issues during implementation. Partner 1 described the need for “micro-design” to address how gender roles in handling household resources varied from community to community. Some IPs report shifting approaches based on the gender context. For example, at the time of the study, Partner 2 was distributing vouchers to women, which was a change from the beginning of their program when they distributed to men. Partner 2 and Partner 5 adapted to the polygamous setting by registering each wife as a separate household to prevent intra-household tensions. Partner 4, on the other hand, reports that they conducted analysis on women and youth, and they determined it was better not to target the female head of household because it would disrupt the existing hierarchy and could cause harm. IPs have used sensitization tactics that engage all members of the household as well as community and religious leaders to emphasize why women are the recipients and the importance of using the assistance for food. The success of sensitization has varied. Even with sensitization and regular monitoring of gender-based violence (GBV), several IPs noted there was continued unease among men and community leaders regarding women receiving the vouchers/cash.

The majority of e-voucher cardholders and market shoppers in Maiduguri are women. Female beneficiary interviews all conclude this is the best approach because (a) many households are female-headed widows, (b) women know the needs of the household, and (c) if the husband is present, he might divert some of the resources for purposes other than food, such as business. Male beneficiary cardholders said they consult with their wives about what to purchase. IDP males’ opinions in FGDs were mixed on whether it is better to give males or females control of the cards. In cases where the male head of household was absent at the time of beneficiary registration, his wife was registered and received the card. IPs conducted sensitization exercises separately with men and women about the purpose and use of the cards. When asked during FGDs, respondents said they knew of no reports of violence or tension in households caused by the program. In FGDs, follow up questions to participants did not elicit information that could be investigated within the scope of this study. Some KIIs speculated that GBV was underreported. IPs said that in rural areas of northern Nigeria, it may be more common within families with adult males for the female to stay in the household and the male to go shopping in the market. Due to emergency food assistance programs and the disruption of social customs caused by displacement (including missing men), women in urban/peri-urban camp settings may be handling more of the family’s business than before the emergency.

The descriptions of the benefits and risks of the voucher did not differ greatly between male and female focus groups. The main difference observed by the study team is that the women interviewed discussed

how they engaged in petty trading and small income-earning activities using some portion of the food voucher/cash transfer more so than the men. They bake soybean cakes to sell, engage in cap-sewing, and conduct petty trading of firewood, detergent, and vegetables in order to grow their income and pay for other basic needs or school fees. The men's focus groups reported monetizing the food voucher benefits (i.e., selling food) more often than the women; though, the study team was not able to determine if monetization was actually done more by beneficiary men or if the women were less likely to admit to it. Both men and women reported needing more income to service their debts, for medical expenses, and schools fees, among other needs. (The burden of debt facing IDP households is discussed further in the section below on Food Security Outcomes.) The study team finds the integrated delivery model is particularly timely and appropriate in light of these additional household needs.

While there were also no reports of conflict caused by other community members because of their participation in the program, sharing a part of the ration is widespread and considered necessary to avoid tensions. Each focus group mentioned sharing small amounts of their benefits with other households to smooth over "anger" or "anxiety" and because there are many people in need. Participants in one FGD explained how they change whom they share with each month to keep the peace. Two separate FGDs estimated that about 10 percent of IDPs in the area of their camps are receiving the voucher (from Partner 1 and Partner 2), and there are new arrivals every day; Partner 1, for example, estimates their coverage in that area at 20 percent per interviews with staff. Increasing program coverage would reduce ration dilution caused by sharing (which is further discussed in Food Security Outcomes).

A final point on gender, the study team finds that the food voucher modality involves nearly all male vendors because men are more likely to be the medium and large-size vendors while women are smaller vendors in the market. UCT, on the other hand, would likely benefit a wider range of market actors, including women and vulnerable groups who are operating as small vendors and petty traders. This is mentioned further in section 5 and in the Recommendations.

**TIMELINESS:** Conflict-affected populations, some of whom had been displaced for two to three years by the time the international emergency response began, had severe and immediate food security needs, necessitating timely (i.e., quick) response by IPs. While establishing cash and voucher pipelines for their first emergency food security programs, IPs took an average of four months and as much as six months to deliver the first transfer. Once IPs had established their programs, they were able to register new recipients and make voucher transfers within one month. Partner 7 staff said that LRP improved timeliness and reduced transport costs compared to in-kind foods. Partner 7's distribution hub in Kano can procure locally purchased food as soon as a donor contribution is confirmed, with a two-week turnaround. Partner 1 made small-scale local and regional purchases (about 300 MT) and completed distribution in one month.

**FREQUENCY OF DISTRIBUTIONS:** Transfer schedules were based on meeting food security needs of conflict-affected and/or displaced people, not on seasonality (e.g., lean season). Each IP program was designed to transfer food assistance (i.e., in-kind food, cash, or food vouchers) to beneficiaries monthly. Pipeline breaks for in-kind food reduced distribution frequency for Partner 7. Conflict and security concerns also delayed and disrupted Partner 7's distributions, initially broadly and persistently across Borno State.

**ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR:** The private sector was engaged in contractual relationships. This included market vendors, large-scale LRP suppliers, transporters, and e-voucher and SIM service

providers described further below. The main complaint by participating vendors is delayed payments. IPs are working to address this challenge.

## **IP INVESTMENTS IN CAPACITY**

IPs have made investments in building capacity. They have (as discussed above in “Capacity”) sent staff with relevant experience to Nigeria to help establish programs, and, to varying degrees, IPs have developed monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning systems and internal guidelines and policies for cash and food transfer programs (e.g., WFP 2014). E-voucher companies provided training to IP staff that was cascaded to vendors and program implementation staff. As part of its local and regional procurement process, Partner 7 worked with suppliers and testing labs to strengthen quality standards and methods.

**PARTNERSHIPS AND COORDINATION:** IP partnerships are limited to contractual relationships with donors and e-voucher and cash transfer companies. Companies providing these services are described in Annex 1: E-Vouchers/ mobile money providers.

**COORDINATION:** The study finds that IP scale-up, coupled with GoN political, bureaucratic, and security constraints have hindered effective, formal coordination to date. This is changing for the better. IPs initially had difficulty staffing operations in Nigeria due to security concerns and visa and work permit delays. During 2015-16, IPs and USAID relied on expert staff on short-term assignments. During 2017, USAID and IPs recruited and placed staff on one- and two-year assignments in Abuja and Maiduguri. This staffing issue has extended to coordinators for both the food and cash working groups. The Cash Working Group does not have a coordinator. An OFDA-funded coordinator was supposed to arrive in mid-2017 but was delayed due to visa issues. There was also a gap until June 2017 in staffing the FAO-funded Food Security Working Group. The DART was comprised of staff on short-term assignments until July 2017.

All actors in the emergency response acknowledge that coordination has been informal among IPs. NGO IPs have shared information with other IPs such as about targeting criteria, transfer amounts, geographic coverage of programs, and the amount of nutrition needs being met. IPs have also worked together to conduct joint needs assessments. However, some IPs are reluctant to share community level information such as beneficiary lists and geographic micro-targeting. There is no master beneficiary list. IPs using the Red Rose voucher transfer platform discussed cross checking their beneficiary lists but have not yet agreed to do it. At the time of field work, a memorandum of understanding had been awaiting signature for three months. At the field level, IPs in Maiduguri coordinate well.

GoN does not allow the Cluster model of coordination.<sup>7</sup> Working groups therefore have not had the cooperation, organization, and staffing that a cluster would have. Organizations do not send senior or decision-making staff to working group meetings, which hinders decision-making because staff representatives cannot speak for their organizations. The 5 W’s (who does what, where) coordination tool lists organizations providing assistance by location and beneficiary numbers,<sup>8</sup> but the review team

---

<sup>7</sup> The Cluster approach is a system for coordinating humanitarian actors to reduce gaps and overlaps. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations in each of the sectors (e.g., water, food security, health). (UN OCHA N.d.)

<sup>8</sup> Sector specific groups have created 5 Ws list, for example UNICEF’s nutrition sector. Source: Humanitarian Response. N.d. <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/nigeria/document/nutrition-sector-nigeria-5ws-updated-till-31th-july-2017-who-does-what>



noted and KILs confirmed that the information for Nigeria is inaccurate and incomplete. NGOs and UN organizations do not consistently report to working groups.

The Swiss Embassy is the secretariat for donor coordination, but coordination has been constrained by high turnover among donor staff, including at FFP. Partner 7 said donors should lead efforts to harmonize activities. CaLP said that IPs working across the spectrum of donors, most notably FFP and ECHO, initially did not harmonize the food basket and percent of MDRs being met. More recently, ECHO and FFP have attempted to harmonize and meet 70 percent of MDRs.

Donors are committed to improving IP and donor coordination. FFP staff acknowledged in interviews with the review team that coordination among IPs was deficient at first, but FFP would be fully staffed by July 2017, which they expect will allow them to take a stronger role coordinating IPs. FFP and OFDA have a joint strategy and conduct a joint review of concept notes submitted by applicants. While there is no sign that the weak coordination hampered the initial response, as donors increase their commitments, effective coordination will become more important.


### FOOD SECURITY OUTCOMES

FEWS NET in Abuja reported that the emergency response in Nigeria has improved food security to the point that conflict-affected areas have recovered a full Integrated Phase Classification from emergency to crisis, or crisis to stressed.

Food security indicators monitored by IPs varied greatly. Some IPs measured progress quarterly for indicators such as the CSI and household dietary diversity score, while others did not. The FCS and Household Hunger Scale were measured at baseline and endline. IPs defined and measured some indicators differently. As of July 2017, FFP began requiring IPs to report on a standard set of indicators. One challenge in tracking and interpreting indicators in Nigeria is the fluidity of the beneficiary population: beneficiaries move out of program areas after a short time, and new beneficiaries are added after the initial baseline study.

Available IP data that regularly track the CSI and household dietary diversity score indicate a trend of significant improvements in scores at the first and second follow-up (as reported in PDMs), and then stabilized scores. The review team posits that plateauing scores may indicate that after the initial improvement in food security, other factors constrain further improvements in the indicators.

The success of Partner 1's initial response is evidenced in the improvements in FCS from December 2015 to August 2016 (Figure 3). In this program over 61 percent of the target population had poor FCS at baseline. After eight months of programming, FCS improved, with just 15 percent of households experiencing poor FCS.




Over 57 percent had acceptable scores at endline, representing a large improvement from almost zero at baseline. The FCS is a composite index that combines measures for dietary diversity and meal frequency.

“Life History 1: Fatima” (below) provides an example of a beneficiary whose food security improved but who still struggled to meet other needs.

Based on project reports, interviews with staff and beneficiaries, the study team finds that food security outcomes were not as good as could have been achieved because of several factors. First, a portion of the cash voucher value was used to pay household debts that had been incurred during displacement and prior to FFP-funded market-based emergency programming. Partner 1’s baseline study in Borno found that beneficiaries incurred high levels of household debt, usually to purchase food. Second, only some of the FFP-funded emergency food security programs provide complementary activities to improve food security such as WASH, health services, and therapeutic feeding. Third, all FGDs reported sharing their food or cash benefits, which likely reduced the amount of food consumed by beneficiary households and inhibits achievement of food security outcomes. Of course, there are likely other contributing factors as well, which are outside the scope of this review to assess.

IPs have monitored and assessed modality implementation and made changes such as altering the content of the e-voucher to better address food security needs when nutrition assessments showed extremely low dietary diversity among households. For example, as mentioned earlier, Partner 2 created a high-nutrient wallet within the food voucher to ensure household consumption of protein. Some IPs added a cash element to cover transportation and water to mitigate against the monetization of the food. Partner 4 used CFW to restore host community assets, such as schools and water systems that had been exhausted or destroyed during the emergency. This activity targeted IDPs and host community members already in the e-voucher program to provide supplemental cash. It aimed to smooth tensions related to resource use between displaced and host populations as they would continue to reside side by side for the foreseeable future.

## Voucher improves well-being of IDP after facing terror and tragedy



\*Name has been changed. The graph for this study was developed by subjective ratings of life events by the TANGO team.

**Fatima** was born in a town a few hours from Maiduguri. She was the first child of nine. As a young child she remembers that her family was healthy and ran a large farm. They produced sorghum, okra, millet, groundnut, groundnuts, cowpea, and maize and raised cattle, sheep, goats, and chickens. Her mother sold fried groundnuts, local drinks, and pancakes for extra income, and Fatima helped her, enjoying the sales aspect of the work. It was a very good childhood, and these were the best moments of her life. However, she and some of her siblings only attended Koranic school, not formal school, due to lack of funds. At age 14, she was married to a man from her village. After a year they had their first child, a girl, who is now 17 years old. She had seven children before the conflict. They had a good sized farm and life was going well, she says.

Problems with Boko Haram started in 2014. Insurgents ransacked her village, stole all the farm assets, took residents captive, and separated the boys and men. In the chaos, some of her children fled with relatives and some stayed with her, but one child, a five-year old boy, went missing and was never found. While captive, Fatima and some of her family snuck away during the night, and they walked for two weeks to Cameroon. Fatima was pregnant, and she suffered a snake bite on her foot that needed to heal, so they stayed for a week in the camp of a large border town. For a few weeks they travelled by night from town to town. Then the host community of one town paid for trucks to drive them back to Maiduguri, Nigeria, which was thought to be safe. The trucks were packed tightly with people, and over five days of travelling, seven people died, and Fatima had a miscarriage.

They were dropped at the main gate to Maiduguri. Fatima stayed there in a makeshift camp until a relative spotted her and brought her to another camp. She was very sick and dehydrated. There was no assistance being offered at this time, and they were begging from anyone who would help. After seven months in the camp, her husband found her, and the rest of her family was back together. Her husband now tries to find day labor such as unloading trucks. Ten months ago Fatima began receiving e-vouchers. Her family now has enough food, which has improved their well-being a lot, though it is not enough to keep the children in school. Six weeks before the interview, Fatima bore her eighth child, a healthy boy. She dreams of the day they will return to the farm.

## 4. COST-EFFICIENCY TRENDS

Title II commodities delivered to northeastern Nigeria are more expensive than the same commodities in local retail markets, based on IP estimates in proposals. IPs routinely compare the cost of U.S.-sourced in-kind aid to LRP during the funding proposal process, as exemplified by Table 2 below, which compares the price of staples (e.g., maize, rice) from the United States and in Nigeria in September 2016. In this example, all Title II commodities with ocean freight and internal transport, storage and handling costs are more expensive than locally purchased equivalents. By using LRP, FFP and IPs realize significant cost savings.

**Table 2: Cost comparison of in-kind food aid and local purchase of commodities (USD)**

	Title II commodities				Local purchase in Nigeria	
	Price per MT	Ocean Freight (to West Africa)	ITSH IP-Nigeria Rate	Total	Price per MT from Kano (wholesale except for oil)	Price per MT from Maiduguri (Retail)
<b>Maize</b> (yellow for Title II, white for Nigeria)	300.00	288.65	291.19	<b>879.84</b>	424.00	424.00
<b>Rice</b> (Nigeria local rice)	450.00	288.65	291.19	<b>1,029.84</b>	981.00	1,239.00
<b>Pulses</b> (white cowpeas for Nigeria, pinto for USA)	721.00	288.65	291.19	<b>1,300.84</b>	576.00	811.00
<b>Sorghum</b> (white for Nigeria)	245.00	288.65	291.19	<b>824.84</b>	480.00	554.00
<b>Oil</b> (refined palm oil in Nigeria, vegetable oil for USA)	1,105.00	288.65	291.19	<b>1,684.84</b>	1,518.00	1,271.00

Source: IP proposal for EFSP funds, 2016.

An added factor is the multiplier effect within regional and local markets. The operational cost of implementing an in-kind or market-based project are comparable at the distribution, monitoring, and reporting levels. Therefore, the major determinant of cost-efficiency is the cost of procuring and delivering the commodity to the distribution point.

## 5. DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS

**CASH AND VOUCHER IMPACTS ON LOCAL ECONOMIES/MARKETS/VENDORS:** The food voucher modality has positively impacted local markets, participating vendors, and their suppliers, and vendor capacity and resilience has improved. Vendors interviewed for this case study faced a near total market shutdown during the Boko Haram insurgency in Maiduguri in 2013-2014. For some, their shops were burned or destroyed with the rest of the market. These vendors started recuperating in 2015, when some markets were rebuilt with help from the state government. According to vendor interviews, the cash and carry nature of the markets initially caused vendors to hesitate to partner with FFP IPs

because the IPs only pay the vendors after they presented proof of sales to beneficiaries. These credit sales payable by the IPs represented a risk to the vendors. The vendors interviewed characterized themselves as more willing than other vendors in the market to take on the risk of joining the program. Each of the vendors participating in the program was part of larger retail operations whose scale allowed them to risk entering the program. These vendors said they looked at the program as a temporary opportunity, but hoped they could capitalize on it, such as increased locations, product lines, and expanded customer base. All vendors interviewed for this review stated that their businesses have grown, some indicating by 40-100 percent because of the program. They report increased supply, new products, increased number of employees, and expansion of their shop and storage locations. One of the six vendors reported adding three suppliers to his network.

***“Thank God I joined the [FFP-funded] program... I have had many improvements and profit because of the [additional] contracts. We thank God for that, praying to give them much blessing for what they are doing in the country and the world.”  
~Vendor, Maiduguri, whose shop was burned and closed during the conflict***

Beneficiaries noted observable improvements in vendors’ shops and the products they carry; some also noted that vendors provide free transportation to and from their shops. The capacity building of vendors by IPs has allowed vendors to learn new technology and systems for tracking what is purchased with the vouchers, printing receipts, and using verification methods such as biometrics. Some vendors are concerned about maintaining their expanded business without the guaranteed sales. Because voucher programs have helped raise some vendors’ status, some are confident that they can continue to grow or become wholesalers.

The study team finds that economic benefits from food vouchers are largely restricted to mid- to large-size vendors and their suppliers. UCT would likely benefit a wider range of market actors, including smaller vendors and women. To respond to food voucher-based increases in business, vendors reported hiring additional labor (five to seven new employees per vendor) and purchasing items from smaller, neighbor vendors when their own stocks have run low during a distribution. One IP staff explained that if these market based programs using vouchers for food and cash were not in Maiduguri, farmers would be selling for very low prices because of low demand and insecurity along roads.

***“The mobile phone fundamentally changes the way rural Africa works, and Nigeria is no different.” ~IP staff***

Mobile money has the potential to open new networks and safety net supports for beneficiaries. Partner 7 and one of the NGO IPs implemented mobile money transfers through Airtel (linked to Access Bank) and experienced numerous challenges. However, mobile transfers have potential for important developmental knock-on effects. Mobile money is a new feature for telecommunications companies in Nigeria. FFP-funded programs have provided sensitization and access to SIM cards for a population that is largely rural and illiterate. Many households now own phones for the first time and are learning how to use them, both for the program and in other ways that benefit their lives and livelihoods. For instance, IPs report that beneficiaries can receive remittances from relatives in other parts of the country or around the world, or if their child is sick, they can call more quickly to get help transporting the child to the hospital. The phones increase beneficiaries’ social networks and social capital, which is building an informal social safety net for them to rely on in times of need—another component of the absorptive capacity of building resilience to shocks.

Some IPs believed this promotion of mobile money and phone use among the IDP population is the first step to increased development. When IDPs return to their farming communities, they will continue to use mobile services if there is coverage. There will be new demand after this emergency, but there is a question of whether the telecommunications companies will be enthusiastic to respond. IPs reported benefits to the local economy of a CT program, e.g., Airtel has hired dozens of new mobile money agents to do the distributions, people are buying in their local government areas and communities, and it has a “multiplier effect” improving markets, as well as household well-being, allowing for choice, dignity, and diet diversification.

**LRP IMPACT ON LOCAL ECONOMIES/MARKETS:** (Refer back to discussion above in Procurement section). Overall, key informants, vendors, IPs, and beneficiaries agree that food prices did not increase because of the program, but because of the devaluation of the Nigerian Naira and national market policies (e.g., government tariffs on imported rice). Partner 7 market assessments have found that Partner 7 purchases do not affect the prices in the large markets where they purchase. Prices have moved as expected, cycling higher for both commodities on their list and others not being procured by Partner 7. Partner 7 staff said its LRP benefits the local economy.

**OTHER IMPACTS:** A psychosocial impact described by beneficiaries is the feeling of dignity and peace of mind in using the voucher during recovery. This peace of mind is founded in the reliability and ease of receiving the voucher transfer. The transfers are regular and on time, made possible “with a push of a button” explains one IP staff. Female beneficiaries in focus groups describe how during this program they could finally eat and sleep with some ease for the first time after years of conflict and suffering. The review team finds that this psychosocial element of confidence and dignity is an essential first step to recovery and self-sufficiency.

## **LIFE HISTORIES**

In-depth individual life history narratives of beneficiaries are included in Annex 6: Life history interviews.

## **6. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES THAT SHOULD CONTINUE**

- Continue the use of e-vouchers for food where nutrition assessments show high food insecurity and low household dietary diversity. Expand coverage and ensure that the transfer consistently meets 70 percent of the MDR.
- Continue use of the high-nutrient wallet. Consider expanding the use of the high-nutrient wallet across IPs to guide households in purchasing nutritious foods and protein, but modify the wallet to be an additional transfer in addition to the amount needed for staples.
- Continue to refine the household vulnerability criteria and harmonize across IPs in the same geographic area, and ensure beneficiaries understand the targeting criteria and the supplemental nature of their food benefit.

### **APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES TO MODIFY**

- Consider using a single e-voucher provider across FFP partners. This would allow IPs to instantly verify duplicate registrations and more easily coordinate market baskets, target



populations, and target locations. This would harmonize data collection and streamline donor reporting, and potentially result in cost-saving through scale.

- Consider meeting beneficiary preferences by providing a mixed modality relief package that includes both e-cash and e-food vouchers. This can potentially be coordinated across donors to cover items outside the FFP mandate.
- Greatly expand the number of beneficiaries reached, as far as funding and other constraints allow. Increasing coverage in existing program areas will reduce the community-level tensions and sharing of benefits caused by the existing low coverage observed at the time of the study.
- Initiate and facilitate a lessons learned process with IPs to determine best practices in gender-sensitive analysis and programming design.
- Conduct operational research with IPs to evaluate UCT versus FV modalities in this context. Use this research to reflect on the lessons learned, benefits, and risks of these modalities across varied program contexts, and to determine if/how it is appropriate to transition FV to increased use of UCT during the recovery phase.
- Use the expertise of FEWS NET and other actors to train and ensure IPs are gathering statistically robust, consistent, timely and accurate market data that will enable FFP and IPs to monitor market impacts and modify the program or modality accordingly.
- Ensure that numbers of beneficiaries reached are accurate and widely available. At the time of the study, there was no central clearinghouse, such as a Food Security Cluster, for providing accurate numbers of beneficiaries reached. These should be both aggregated and broken down by partner location, type of activity, gender and age cohort, and month.
- Provide M&E guidance to IPs to address the challenge of measuring food security outcomes among a shifting beneficiary population.
- Explore ways of building on the example of using multiple funding streams as was done with Feed the Future, OFDA, and FFP - layering activities in the areas of agriculture, livelihoods, protection, health, WASH, protection, and education to increase resilience and further transition from emergency relief to human and economic development. Further, IPs should build upon the income generating activities that female beneficiaries are already engaged with the expansion of gender-sensitive livelihood recovery programs.
- Explore how to spread the significant benefit for participating vendors to women vendors through small enterprise development including capital, training, and capacity building.

## 7. ANNEXES

### ANNEX I: E-VOUCHERS/ MOBILE MONEY PROVIDERS

**sQuid Card Limited** – United Kingdom registered private e-money issuer for education, transit fare, money transfer and relief transfers. Swipe card has the beneficiary’s photo, name, name of next of kin and PIN. sQuid takes a monthly and per transaction fee, provides staff training and sells the scanner and printer. Partner 4 field staff described the service as passable, slow but functional, inferior to Red Rose.

**Segovia** – United States registered tech sector inspired and informed company founded to make voucher transfers in relief situation. Segovia provides staff training and takes a percentage of each transaction. Segovia cleans registration data and transfers funds from Partner 5 to African multinational money transfer provider Cellulant in Nigeria. Segovia uses beneficiary ID card with PIN and provides scanners and printers. Partner 5 field staff expressed satisfaction with the service.

**Red Rose** – United Kingdom registered electronic cash transfer company specializing in emergency response situations. Red Rose provides staff training, provides biometric readers, cards and printers. Chip Card has beneficiary’s photo and name. Uses right thumb print reader biometric and PIN. The provider takes a percentage of each transaction. Field staff from Partners 1 and 2 expressed satisfaction and praised all aspects of the service.

**Bharti Airtel Limited** – Indian registered telecommunications company operating in Asia and Africa that provides cash transfers via SIM cards. SIM cards are issued to beneficiaries, and then loaded with credit. Airtel deploys field agents at point of sale. Cards are inserted in a phone at point of sale to be read by Airtel agents. A commission is taken on each transaction. Partner 7 was non-committal but did not offer any positive comments on service. Partner 3 field staff expressed dissatisfaction with the service and commitment of Airtel’s field agents

**Master Card Aid Network** – United States registered subsidiary of financial services company Master Card that was started to serve the relief community. Swipe card has no photo or biometrics, uses PIN. Partner 3 stopped using the service after 2016 because of a lack of technical support from New York. Master Card Aid is currently not being used by IPs.

**Cellulant** – Kenyan registered company providing mobile money transfer platforms since 2007, operating in eight African countries through 25 banks. Cellulant partnered with Segovia and Partner 5.

## ANNEX 2: SUMMARY TABLE OF FFP FUNDING IN NIGERIA, AWARDED FY2015-2016

Project Name	IP	Award date	Original Budget (USD)	Planned modalities	Funding type
<b>FY15</b>					
AID-FFP-G-15-00005 (Phase I Yobe State)	Partner I	12/4/2014	\$3,000,000	CT/ Food voucher (FV) (beneficiary decides which to use)	EFSP
AID-FFP-G-15-00076 (Phase I Borno State)	Partner I	9/4/2015	\$4,600,000	CT/ FV	EFSP
AID-FFP-G-15-00002	Partner 4	12/4/2014	\$3,915,000	Paper FV (Part I) Cash For Work /CCT (Part II)	EFSP
AID-FFP-G-15-00048 (Adamawa State)	Partner 3	5/1/2015	\$4,162,909	FV	EFSP
AID-FFP-G-15-00058 (Yobe)	Partner 2	6/11/2015	\$2,104,182	FV	EFSP
AID-FFP-IO-15-00012 (with multiple modifications through FY16)	Partner 7	5/8/2015	\$11,180,000 (modified through FY16)	LRP In-kind	Title II, EFSP
AID-FFP-G-15-00060	Partner 6	6/12/15	\$12,227,700 (202e) \$4,320,800 (ITSH); increase 8/10/15 of \$430,457 (202e) \$110,160 (ITSH)	In-kind RUTF	Title II, 202(e)
<b>FY16</b>					
AID-FFP-G-16-00112 (Borno Phase II)	Partner I	10/5/2016	\$6,500,000	FV, CT LRP (shifting to FV)	EFSP
AID-FFP-G-16-00053 (Yobe Phase II)	Partner I	5/27/2016	\$4,300,000	FV, CT	EFSP
AID-FFP-G-16-00058	Partner 4	4/20/2016	\$5,000,000	FV (with small CT)	EFSP
AID-FFP-G-17-00004 <sup>9</sup>	Partner 3	1/30/2017	\$2,611,105.00	CT	EFSP
AID-FFP-G-16-00056 (Expansion to Borno)	Partner 2	5/27/2016	\$5,506,476	FV (with small CT, adding wallets)	EFSP
AID-FFP-G-16-00057	Partner 5	6/6/2016	\$4,000,000	FV	EFSP
AID-FFP-G-16-00100	Partner 6	9/30/16	\$2,542,833 (202e) \$850,792 (ITSH)	RUTF (1,100 MT)	Title II, 202(e)

<sup>9</sup> While the award letter was received January 30, 2017, and thus not captured in the funding charts of this report, the funding was reimbursable for program start up that began in November 2016.

### ANNEX 3: REFERENCES

[In addition to USAID/DCHA/FFP award documents and IP assessments and reports:]

- ACF International. 2016. Action Against Hunger, Borno State, Nigeria FFP Proposal for Phase II. First proposal submitted 14 July 2016.
- Barrett, Christopher B. and Daniel G. Maxwell. 2005. *Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting its role.* Routledge, London and New York.
- Catholic Relief Service (CRS). 2016. EFSP Proposal Narrative FY16. Version: 16 March 2016.
- FEWS NET. 2016. "Alert, A Famine May Have Occurred in Bama Local Government Area and May be Ongoing in Inaccessible Areas of Borno State." December 13, 2016. <http://www.fews.net/west-africa/nigeria/alert/december-13-2016> .
- FEWS NET. 2017a. "Nigeria Price Bulletin." May. <http://www.fews.net/west-africa/nigeria/price-bulletin/may-2017>
- FEWS NET. 2017b. "Special Report: Nigeria Market Monitoring Bulletin." June. <http://www.fews.net/west-africa/nigeria/special-report/june-2017>
- Financial Tracking Service (FTS). Nigeria 2017 (Humanitarian response plan). Accessed 11/2/17 at: <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/536/summary>
- GAO. 2015. "Cash Based Assistance - Strengthen Financial Oversight." Report number GAO-15-328. March 2015.
- GAO. 2016. "Cash Based Food assistance USAID has Established Processes to Monitor Cash and Voucher Projects, but Data Limitations Impede Evaluation." Report number GAO-16-819. September 2016.
- GAO. 2017. "Integrated Food assistance, USAID Needs to Strengthen Financial Oversight." Report number GAO-17-224, March 2017.
- Humanitarian Response. N.d., *Nutrition Sector Nigeria 5Ws - Updated till 31th July 2017 - Who does What Where When and for Whom.* <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/nigeria/document/nutrition-sector-nigeria-5ws-updated-till-31th-july-2017-who-does-what> Accessed September 20, 2017.
- International Organization on Migration (IOM) Nigeria. 2016. Displacement Tracking Matrix. Nigeria Round XIII Report. December 2016.
- International Rescue Committee (IRC). 2016. Emergency Food Response in Borno State Technical Application. Submitted to USAID FFP 18 August 2016.
- Maxwell, Daniel G, Heather Stobaugh, John Parker, and Megan McGlinchy. "Response Analysis and Response Choice in Food Security Crises: A Roadmap." HPN Network Paper Number 73, February 2013.
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). 2015. National Nutrition and Health Survey (NNHS). Report on The Nutrition and Health Situation of Nigeria, Data Collection – 13th July to 13th September 2015. <http://somlpforr.org.ng/pdfs/SMARTResults%202015.pdf>
- Overseas Development Institute and Center for Global Development. "Doing Cash Differently: How Cash Transfers Can Transform Humanitarian Aid, Report of the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers." London: ODI and CDG, 2015.

- Scott, L. and V. Diwakar. 2016. "Ensuring Escapes From Poverty Are Sustained In Rural Bangladesh." USAID Report prepared by Overseas Development Institute (ODI) for ACDI/VOCA with funding from USAID/E3's Leveraging Economic Opportunities (LEO) project. Washington, DC. July. <https://dl.orangedox.com/Transitory-escapes-Bangladesh-2016-n>
- UNDP. 2009. *Handbook on Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluating for Development Results*. Handbook Website: <http://www.undp.org/eo/handbook>
- UN OCHA. N.d. "Humanitarian Response: What is the Cluster Approach?" <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach> Accessed September 2017.
- USAID/Save the Children/TANGO. 2016. "Inception Report – Review of Food for Peace Market Based Food Assistance Programs." December 2016.
- USAID. N.d. "Use of International Disaster Assistance Funds for Local and Regional Procurement, Cash, and Food Vouchers under the Emergency Food Security Program Report to Congress, FY 2015." <https://www.usaid.gov/open/efsp/fy2015>
- USAID. 2015. Nigeria - Complex Emergency: Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. June 17, 2015. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/06.17.15%20-%20USAID-DCHA%20Nigeria%20Complex%20Emergency%20Fact%20Sheet%20%231.pdf>
- USAID. 2017. Food Assistance Fact Sheet – Nigeria. September 21, 2017. Accessed 11/2/17 at: <https://www.usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance>
- World Food Programme (WFP). 2014. "Fighting Hunger Worldwide Cash and Vouchers Manual, Second Edition 2014." <http://go.wfp.org/web/cash-and-vouchers/home>.
- WFP. 2016a. *Nigeria mVAM Bulletin 1: May 2016*. <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp284225.pdf?iframe>
- WFP. 2016b. *Nigeria mVAM Bulletin 4: October 2016*. <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp287919.pdf?iframe>
- WFP. 2016c. *Nigeria mVAM Bulletin 5: December 2016*. <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp289732.pdf?iframe>
- WFP. 2017a. *mVAM Nigeria Bulletin #6: January/February 2017*.
- WFP. 2017b. *Market Assessment in Borno and Yobe States as part of multi-sectorial capacity assessment for Cash-Based Transfer programming. Data collected in November 2016, Report in March 2017*. [http://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/wfp\\_market\\_assessment\\_in\\_borno\\_and\\_yobe\\_states.pdf](http://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/wfp_market_assessment_in_borno_and_yobe_states.pdf)
- WFP. 2017c. *WFP Nigeria Monthly Donor Meeting Presentation*. June 2017.

## ANNEX 4: INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUPS CONDUCTED

Table 3: Stakeholders interviewed during the Nigeria field mission June 26-July 7, 2017 and/or via Skype prior to the field mission

Organization	Name	Stakeholder type/title
CaLP	Nathalie Cissikho	Technical Advisor
DFID	Earnest Ahtell	Humanitarian Advisor
ECHO	Yasine Gaba	Head of Office
FAO	Sara Netzer	Food Security Working Group Coordinator
FEWS NET	Isa Mainu	National Technical Manager
FEWS NET	Akeem Olusola Ajibola	Assistant National Technical Manager
FFP	Shannon Rogers	Regional Director
FFP	Michelle Juarez	Senior FFP Officer
NEMA	Kayode Fagbemi	Acting Director, Relief & Rehabilitation
OFDA	Katherine Dillon	Program Officer
OFDA	Charles Wanjue	Acting DART Leader
Partner 1		Markets & Cash Advisor (Paris)
Partner 1		M&E Advisor (NY)
Partner 1		Country Director
Partner 1		Dep. Country Director, Programs
Partner 1		Field Coordinator
Partner 1		Maiduguri Field Staff
Partner 2		Emergency Director
Partner 2		Emergency Coordinator
Partner 2		Program Assistant
Partner 3		Program Manager
Partner 3		Livelihoods & Cash Program Specialist
Partner 4		Acting Dir of Humanitarian Programs
Partner 4		Dir. Humanitarian Programs
Partner 4		Sr. Program Officer
Partner 4		Country Director
Partner 5		FFP EFSP Project Director
Partner 5		Sr. Program Manager
Partner 5		Maiduguri Response Staff
Partner 6		Emergency Manager
Partner 7		Head of Supply Chain Logistics Division
Partner 7		Maiduguri Logistics
Partner 7		Maiduguri Logistics
Partner 7		Maiduguri Logistics
Partner 7		Logistics officer, managing funds
Red Rose	Jeremy Cole	New Business Development



**Table 4: Summary data for focus groups/interviews conducted in Nigeria: locations and number and type of participants**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Focus group (FGD) or interview</b>	<b># of participants</b>	<b>Type of participants</b>
Sulumuri Camp	FGD	23	IDP Men
Sulumuri Camp	FGD	15	IDP Women
Siemari Camp	FGD	8	IDP Men
Siemari Camp	FGD	10	IDP Women
Siemari Camp	FGD	9	IDP Men
Siemari Camp	FGD	8	IDP Women
Kawa Maila Camp	FGD	12	IDP Men
Kawa Maila Camp	FGD	15	IDP Women
Lake Chad Market	Vendor – Cash Agent	1	Manager, Male
Customs Market	Vendor – Food Items	1	Owner, Male
Bolori Stalls Market	Vendor – Food Items	1	Owner, Male
Customs Market	Vendor – Food Items	1	Owner, Male
Muna Garage Market	Vendor – Food Items	1	Owner, Male
Muna Garage Market	Vendor – Food Items	1	Owner, Male
Siemari Camp	In Depth Interview	1	IDP, Male
Siemari Camp	In Depth Interview	1	IDP, Male
Siemari Camp	In Depth Interview	1	IDP, Female
Siemari Camp	In Depth Interview	1	IDP, Female

## ANNEX 5: APPROACH

**Purpose:** This review of FFP market-based emergency programming (MBEP) activities from 2010-2016 has four objectives: (1) document the history and evolution of FFP market-based emergency assistance; (2) review program design and implementation processes; (3) analyze program cost-efficiency trends;<sup>10</sup> and (4) qualitatively assess the effects of FFP projects on local economies and market actors.

The review team used a multi-layered approach that drew on an expansive body of literature relevant to emergency food assistance programming, program documents from FFP and its IPs, an online survey, quantitative indicator data from FFP projects, KIIs,<sup>11</sup> and field visits to case study crisis sites where emergency food programming is ongoing. The case study countries were selected to represent ongoing FFP programming around the world and included a mix of slow-onset crises, acute crises, and regional emergencies.

The global review employed two levels of analysis. The first was a systems-level analysis of the evolution of market-based programming at FFP (refer to the Global Report for this analysis). The second level was a comparative case study analysis in which northern Nigeria is one of the seven case studies. The purpose of the case study analysis is to review in closer detail how projects were designed, implemented, monitored, evaluated, and adapted, comparing and contrasting the strengths and limitations of different modality applications in each case. The analysis looks at the extent to which these projects were well-coordinated and complementary to address food security needs, noting any constraints to an effective response. The review also explores and documents promising practices from these field cases that may be emergent best practices.

**Case methodology:** The Nigeria field work was conducted June 28 and July 4-6, 2017, in Abuja, and June 29-July 3, 2017, in Maiduguri. The Nigeria methodology employed a multi-layered approach including document review and qualitative and participatory primary data collection including:

- Desk review of meta data including reports from technical papers from CaLP, VAM, WFP Bulletins, FEWS NET, OFDA catalogs of activities and factsheets (#1-18), EFSP Annual Program Statements, IP program proposals, award documents, quarterly reports, and annual results reports.
- Field work in Abuja and Maiduguri included 36 KIIs, four beneficiary IDIs, eight IDP FGDs (52 men/48 women), and six vendor interviews.
- Note: Interviews were sought with individuals at multiple levels, including headquarters and field-based staff from FFP, OFDA, the Cash Learning Partnership, and IPs, plus KIIs with ECHO, FAO, NEMA, UNICEF, and DFID. The IDI Life Histories in Annex 6 are based on in-depth qualitative interviews using methodology adapted from ODI (Scott and Diwakar 2016).
- Responses from participants were triangulated across the data sources to crosscheck the reliability of information.

Due to the severely restricted movement caused by the ongoing conflict, the study team was restricted in its fieldwork to secure areas of Maiduguri where four of the NGO IPs were implementing EFSP-funded activities. Because of these restrictions, the review team visited only

---

<sup>10</sup> The appropriate program documents and data on cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness were not available by FFP/W for TANGO to perform the cost-efficiency analysis.

<sup>11</sup> KI include: donors, government officials, implementing partners, vendors or other community members, and beneficiaries.

three of the four NGO IPs in Maiduguri. The team purposively selected field sites in close coordination with the hosting IPs based on factors of: security and current implementation of EFSP activities, and to view some variation in terms of voucher technology in use. The study team adhered to IP security protocols. This limited site visits to IDP camps and vendors, which could last no more than an hour in any one location, and all visits were conducted during a short span of daylight hours.

The review team was comprised of two international and two national consultants (two men/two women) with extensive experience with humanitarian contexts in the region and in qualitative methods. To ensure quality, the team analyzed the data on a daily basis, implementing systematic checks on accuracy, consistency, reliability, and validity of the data through regular communication with FFP and IPs. The international team members were assisted during fieldwork by interpreters provided by the hosting IP. The review approach observed ethical principles for evaluators of competence, integrity, honesty, informed consent, systematic inquiry, respect for people, and responsibilities for public welfare.<sup>12</sup>


---

<sup>12</sup> Aligned with the American Evaluation Association's Guiding Principles for Evaluators (2004).

## ANNEX 6: LIFE HISTORY INTERVIEWS

Life History 2: Aisha

### Voucher brings normalcy and recovery to IDP family after facing conflict



\*Name has been changed The graph for this study was developed by subjective ratings of life events by the TANGO team.

**Aisha** is 33 years old. She was born in Maiduguri. She was healthy as a young child. Her dad worked as a driver, and her mom ground maize to sell. She was the eldest of 14 children and describes her childhood as fair with no major events. Aisha attended school from ages 8 to 18, nearly finishing secondary level. She loved English, math, and social studies. All of her siblings except for two, who passed away due to illnesses, finished school and began work.


At age 18 she was married to a businessman introduced to her by a neighbor. Her husband would not allow her to continue her education. She says she wanted to stay in school to become a medical doctor. They started a family right away. She bore six healthy children, though as the family grew she remarks it was increasingly hard to feed everyone. She sold local nuts to make extra income.

When the conflict began to affect Maiduguri, Aisha moved with her family to her husband's village, a day's travel away, where they lived until Boko Haram took over that area too. Boko Haram entered their village and kidnapped all of the residents, including pregnant Aisha and five of her children, holding them in a nearby settlement. Her eldest, a 16 year old boy, fled to Niger by foot to avoid being killed along with the other young males by Boko Haram. Her husband was away on business. Aisha says her other boys survived the abduction with her because they were disguised as girls when they heard Boko Haram was near. After a week, they were released and fled to Niger with nothing but the clothes on their backs. They stayed one month in Niger, and Aisha's father came to help them travel back to Maiduguri. Aisha's husband and eldest son joined them there, and Aisha gave birth to their seventh child.

Aisha and her family now rent a one-room house near the camp for internally displaced persons. Her husband continues to try to do business, although travel in the region is restricted. All of her school-aged children attend public school. Aisha tries to sell cooked food for extra income. She recounts how when the program started, she was ill, and there was no food in their home. The children were not in school, and they didn't have clean water to drink. Now, Aisha says, they have food and water and she uses the small cash transfer to pay her children's school fees.

## Life History 3: Ahmed

### Voucher aids in IDP survival, but there is a long road to recovery



\*Name has been changed. The graph for this study was developed by subjective ratings of life events by the TANGO team.

**Ahmed**, 42 years old, isn't at ease with the idea of receiving assistance. Before he was displaced by Boko Haram insurgents in 2014, he was a successful farmer in his home village in Borno State, Nigeria. Ahmed grew up on his father's 125-acre farm. "We were never hungry," he said. "We were always happy and very comfortable. It was a good time." In secondary school, he was a star striker on the school's soccer team and planned to go to university. But those youthful dreams were never fulfilled. In the final months of school, his father suddenly died, leaving 22 children and three wives.

A good son, Ahmed graduated secondary school and forgot about university. He worked to support his large family by farming his late father's land growing beans, maize and onions and raising cows, goats, and chickens. He married his first wife, Amma. As the years passed, Ahmed inherited a section of his father's land and bought adjacent plots until he had his own 125-acre farm.


After 10 years of marriage to Amma, Ahmed fell in love with Mariam. She soon became his second wife. Together their love marriage produced six more children. The combined households of two wives and 15 children lived comfortably on the farm.

Recently, Ahmed sat on a woven plastic mat on the ground at the displaced person's camp where he lives with his wives and children. His eyes were downcast. He hugged his leg to his chest and rested his chin on his knee, then quietly said that on the day Boko Haram arrived in 2014, Ahmed was out in his fields, unable to return to his compound. With nowhere to go, he frantically fled to the bushes, leaving his large family behind. He could not go back. Over the next week he walked the 90 miles to Maiduguri. Over the next two months, his brothers smuggled his wives and children out of the village. Each of them walked by night to reach Maiduguri until, finally, the family was back together.

"This is the saddest time," he said. To augment his cash and food vouchers from the IP program, he works as a day laborer and occasional carpenter and tries not to dwell on his former life. "I used to be the one to assist people. Now I am the one assisted. It makes me very sad," he said.

## Life History 4: Ibrahim

### Voucher allows for some improvements to the difficult IDP life



\*Name has been changed. The graph for this study was developed by subjective ratings of life events by the TANGO team.

**Ibrahim** has perpendicular razor scars etched into his nose, cheeks, and forehead. When asked about them, he laughs. He smiles easily, and a life of smiling and laughing has left lines across his bearded face. The scars? Nothing serious, they are the tribal marks he received when he was one week old, in 1942, in his village, Ibrahim explained. He'd been delivered by a traditional birth attendant in his father's house, the second of eight children.

His father owned a 125-acre farm where he kept goats and cows and chickens and grew maize, and peanuts. If there were ever hard times, Ibrahim and his four brothers and three sisters never knew it. There was always enough food for the children. "We were not wealthy, but it was manageable," he said.

Ibrahim and the other older children in his family did not go to school. For a long time, his parents were frightened at the thought of sending their children to school. He laughed through worn and broken teeth at the memory of being sent to a neighboring village after he tried to go to school. Eventually, his three youngest sisters and brother went to school. Not learning to read, or to write anything more than his own name, is one Ibrahim's few regrets.

He started working his father's farm as a child. It was a life he loved. Over the years, Ibrahim, his brothers, and sisters all grew up, married, and started their own families in that village.

At the age of 28, Ibrahim left home and married 16-year-old Fatima on one of the happiest days of his life. Together they started their own 12.5-acre farm, which was productive and provided them with food and cash throughout the year. He sold beans and peanut crops for cash. Together they raised maize, vegetables, sheep, goats, and chickens that provided an ample diet.

For more than two decades, it was just Ibrahim and Fatima. Three of their babies died in infancy. These were sad shocks in a time of prosperity and happiness. Finally, in 1989, after 22 years of marriage, a son was born, strong, and healthy. It was the happiest day of his life.

Over the next 22 years, seven more healthy boys and girls filled their home. There was always enough to eat. Farming was hard but happy work. However, as he aged into his sixth decade of life, Ibrahim found that farming was becoming too much for him. His sons and daughters were by then either attending school or starting careers and families of their own. There was nobody available to



help on the farm, so he left the village and moved his entire family to the nearest big town. There he found work driving trucks. His eldest son opened a clothing stall in the market. His eldest daughter married and had a daughter, his first grandchild. It was a different, yet happy life until 2015 when Boko Haram overran the town.

The family gathered and fled on foot. Fear powered their retreat from the fighting. They covered the more than 40 miles to Maiduguri in just over two days. By the time Ibrahim reached the relative safety of Maiduguri, he collapsed at a friend's door, sick with exhaustion and fear.

These were the worst weeks of his life, worse than the infant deaths of his first children decades earlier. After three months in Maiduguri, he constructed a shelter and moved to a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Since moving to camp 18 months ago, life has improved a little. He gets by on food vouchers and relief items provided by the IP through USAID and other donors. His sons bring in a little income through day labor. Ibrahim wishes his youngest children could return to school, but there are no funds for school or trading.

Ibrahim's mother died at home shortly after Ibrahim arrived in Maiduguri. She was in a conflict area controlled by Boko Haram. Ibrahim's face clouds for a moment as he explains that he regrets that he could not return home to bury her.

Then Ibrahim smiled sadly, "Some close friends have died in displacement."

## ANNEX 7: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW TOOLS

### FGD: BENEFICIARIES

**Moderator to read out loud:**

**Introduction:**

“Hello. Let us introduce ourselves. My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and these are my colleagues \_\_\_\_\_.

We are here today to speak with people who are part of this community and who have been identified as having received support through the NGO Name \_\_\_\_\_ program. We will ask some questions about your experience with the program.

We want to find out more about your views about the assistance you have been receiving.

We also want to know if there is anything that can be done better by programs operating in this area.

Please know that your decision to participate is strictly voluntary – you will not be in trouble for anything you say, or if you decide to leave the discussion. There is no payment for your participation.

Your answers will not affect this program, this year or the assistance you receive.

We are here to ask you about your experiences so that in the future we can design programs that better meet the needs of people like you.

All information discussed is confidential. We will not ask for your names. People will not be identified in the reporting of findings.

Any questions?

Let us begin by going around the circle and introducing ourselves to one another.”

**Reminder to researcher/note-taker: for each question indicate how many agree or disagree and include explanations or examples for those responses.**

**Facilitate appropriate introduction: say names in circle, song, etc.**

**Record for each interview:**

**Total number of people: #, male or female**

**District/community name/IDP, host or mix?:**

**IP NAME:**

**Date:**

**Opening questions:**

- 1) Have you been involved in [IP program \_\_X\_\_]? (should be all because these are beneficiary FGDs)
- 2) What kind of assistance have you received through this program?
  - Number of participants who are receiving cash transfers=
  - Number of participants who are receiving food vouchers=

**Let us discuss Food Aid:**

3) Are you currently receiving/or have you received since the conflict (2014) food aid? (explain these are distributions of rations of food, vegetable oil etc.)

- Number who have received food aid=

4) If you had to choose one type of assistance, which do you prefer: food aid, food vouchers or cash assistance? Why?

- Number who prefer food aid, and why=
- Number who prefer cash, and why=
- Number who prefer vouchers, and why
- Other notes=

Or how many would prefer a mix of these types of aid? Why? (Allow a few to elaborate)

### **VOUCHERS (Food and/or Cash):**

5) For those that received the food voucher, we know that in some cases you must sell that food for cash in order to meet your family's needs. How many of you have done this?

6) We realize that in some cases you may have exchanged your food ration or voucher for cash to meet other family needs. If you got cash that way, or through a cash transfer from the program: Raise hands for categories of general uses of the cash: *of any of the cash received* (count the hands after each category): You can answer more than one. How many used the cash for:

- Food=
- School fees (includes supplies and uniforms)=
- Buy water=
- To pay back a loan=
- To keep some for savings (household box or savings group)=
- Medical assistance/medicines=
- Shelter construction or improvements=
- To buy mobile phone or credit=
- Clothes and/or jewelry=
- Ceremonies= (Specify)
- For other purposes not listed yet?= (Specify)

7) Did any of you start *new* income generating activities because of the E-Voucher or cash transfer?

- Number that started new income activities=
- Explain/Examples:

8) We understand that when you sell the voucher, you do not receive the full value. If you converted 1,000 Naira from your voucher into cash, how much money did you get? (Do all agree this is a likely exchange rate?)

9) Targeting: Some receive the cash transfer and voucher in your community, some do not, is that a problem? (If they respond that the problem was unhappiness among those who didn't receive, probe if any actual problems or conflicts arose)

- Number that say real problems were caused in the village=
- a) Do you know why you were selected to receive the voucher/cash program?

Give explanations, and do all agree?

- b) Do you think the voucher/cash grant is provided to the people who need it most? Why or why not?

Give explanations, and do all agree?

I0) Sharing: Did anyone outside your family ask you to share the voucher or food purchased from the voucher?

- Number that agree?

I1) Security/Protection: Did anyone have to pay for your voucher in return for receiving it?

- Number that had voucher stolen, and explain=

And, did anyone have their voucher stolen?

- Number that had voucher stolen, and explain=

a) What assistance is easier to secure: the cash, voucher or food aid?

- Number that say cash is easier to secure=
- Number that say voucher is easier to secure=
- Food aid?

Explain/Examples:

I2) Gender: Did mostly women receive the voucher/cash for the household or did men receive the vouchers?

Do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea to give women the voucher/cash? Why? Or is it better to give it to the man and why?

(See possible follow up probes below):

- a) Has domestic violence/wife-beating increased, decreased or stayed the same for households where women received voucher/cash?
- b) Who is making the decision about how to use the voucher/cash? Are women who received the cash able to decide how to use it?

I3) \*Community-level benefits\* Is the community as a whole (including those who got cash and those who did not) better because of the cash transfers?

- Number that think the whole community is better= If so, in what ways?
- Number that think the whole community is not better= If not, why not?

(See follow up probes below, get number of those who agree and explanations for each):

- a) Tension in the community: less because of paying off loans, etc....or more because some that need it are not receiving?
- b) Markets are better? (Note: this will be expanded on in the next question)
- c) Forming savings groups?
- d) Hiring labor with the cash such as for farms or other business?
- e) Increased participation in community meetings or other local governance mechanisms? Increased trust among community members? Others?

I4) Markets: (for each question, differentiate what type of market and provide explanations for each)

- a) How far away are these markets by car or by foot? How do you pay to get to/from the market? (cash from income generating activities or credit from selling voucher?) How much?
- b) How many of you are selling food *back* into the market? What types of food? (List number, and types)
- c) Have you noticed any changes in market prices since people started receiving the voucher?
- d) Have you noticed any changes in what's available at the market since people started receiving voucher? (E.g., New or different products available)

15) Efficiency: Did you have any problems with the voucher card not working, or with the machine at the vendor shop? Explain...

- Number who had the above problem?
- Has this problem been fixed?

16) Timeliness: How long were you displaced before you got the voucher? List the number of weeks for each participant: \_\_\_\_\_

How long after receiving the voucher until you got the first transfer? List the number of weeks for each participant: \_\_\_\_\_

17) Food Security: Tell me how the voucher has improved your family's diets (this is open ended to their responses and descriptions of less hunger, better quality of food, eating more meals per day, etc.):

**Supplemental questions- if time**

18) What do you think are the good points of this program for you as women / men /young people and your community (ies)? (Probe: In your view, what helped this program succeed?)

Do all agree? Explain/Examples:

19) What are the negative points or gaps in this program?

Do all agree? Explain/Examples:

20) In your opinion, what could be done to improve this program? Is there anything you think should have been done differently with this voucher program?

*Anything else you would like to share with us?*

**THANK YOU!**

## KII: VENDORS

### Introduction:

Interviewers will introduce themselves and explain the purpose of the interview and how the information will be used. The interviewers will inform the participants that their participation is strictly voluntary, that all information discussed is confidential, and that people will not be individually identified in the reporting of findings.

### Topical Outline:

- 1) When did you start working with [IP project name]?
- 2) How did you learn about it? How did you get involved? Describe the process.
- 3) Did you have to make any changes to your business in order to participate as a vendor? Describe.
- 4) Who establishes the prices for the items you sell? How are the prices established? Are they consistent with market prices? Do you think market prices have been affected by the cash/vouchers made available through this program?
- 5) Do you think the cash/voucher is provided to the people who need it most? Why or why not?
- 6) Who comes to your business to use the cash/voucher? (e.g., women/men/non-beneficiaries?)
- 7) What are the most common purchases people make with the cash/voucher?
- 8) Have you had any problems with this program? Probe if needed. For example:
  - Challenges with the technology (if applicable) and/or internet connectivity
  - Payment: amount, timeliness, procedure
- 9) What impacts has the food aid/cash/voucher program had on your business? (positive and negative) Probe if needed. For example:
  - Did you need to purchase new technology/hardware? Impacts of this?
  - Did you need to hire more employees?
  - Changes in customer base?
  - More or fewer customers?
  - Ability to stock (items and amounts)?
  - Effects on prices?
  - Effects on competition?
  - Other impacts?
- 10) Have you seen any changes in your community because of the food aid/cash/vouchers from this program? Describe.
- 11) Do you think providing food aid/cash/vouchers is a good way to help people in this community? What would you do differently?
- 12) What do you think are the good points of this program for you as women / men /young people and your communities?
- 13) What are the negative points or gaps in this program?
- 14) What can the community do to meet its own food needs?
- 15) In your view, what helped this program succeed?
  - Were there things that prevented this program from succeeding?
- 16) Are there any opportunities to improve this program?



## KII: PARTNERS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

**Topical Outline:** It should be noted this is a guide used for a semi-structured interview.

### Background/capacity to implement

- What is the history of organization in the country, such as your mix of donors and activities, to help us understand better the evolution of EFSP in response to the conflict in NE Nigeria? How ESFP may have changed your programming strategy?
- Learning as a new org to this activity: any trainings or ways you prepared yourselves? Any institutional technical support? How does your org develop capacity?
- Have you participated in CaLP trainings?
- Did you implement CT/vouchers in new geographic areas or communities? What made this possible or not? Challenges? Would you have seen different outcomes if your org had been present before the emergency?
- How has inclusion of cash/vouchers with EFSP introduced any administrative barriers/challenges within the org? (i.e., finance or logistics procedures) How were they overcome?

### Response analysis/modality choices

- We understand you are using (fill in the blank) modalities in this context. What were the key factors that led you to decide to use this mix of modalities? Did the mix change between the original application and now? In what ways?
- Did you conduct response analysis or other assessments to guide your design?
- How appropriate was the targeting?
- What important lessons have you learned about when to choose different modalities (e.g., Title II commodities, cash transfers, food vouchers, and LRP)? Or conditional versus unconditional assistance?
- Have beneficiaries in discussions ever compared in-kind food experiences with cash? Have you asked about their preferences?

### FFP/coordination

- Harmonization efforts with other partners, other donors doing CT/vouchers, WFP/UN?
- How was the functioning of the cash transfer working group? How did coordination effect implementation?
- What was the involvement/support provided by FFP?
- What was the involvement/support provided by government (e.g., district officials, anti-corruption commission), was this effective/helpful?

### Efficiency

- Reasons for other delays (impact of delays on well-being/coping strategies of beneficiaries)?
- How CT/vouchers may be different than Title II programming in terms of timeliness and efficiency for start-up and distributions?
- How would you compare the cost-effectiveness of cash/vouchers versus in-kind commodities?
- Implementation challenges with EFSP?
- Reasons for changes to the project?

- Related to waste/fraud/abuse, compare cash/voucher vs. in-kind commodity? Did you face any issues of waste/ fraud with the CT/vouchers, and if so, how was this addressed?

### **Market changes/private sector readiness**

- How were the labor or food prices during that time period without much cash circulating or with restricted movements? And how did that fluctuate over time delivering CT/voucher?
- What kind of market or price monitoring did you undertake?
- Do you have thresholds for deciding if cash/voucher is adverse to market prices? How are thresholds decided? Ever taken action if thresholds exceeded?
- Overall, rate experience with private institutions engaged with the distributions?
- Market interested in expanding to be that provider? Stimulated/or not because of CT/vouchers?

### **Gender/protection**

- How were household gender dynamics affected if predominantly giving cash/voucher to women?
- Did you monitor intra-household tensions or conflict caused by Cash/vouchers?
- Are there any protection risks specific to CT/voucher?
- How did you monitor and gather complaints/feedback? What were the complaints?

### **Effectiveness/food security**

- What food security indicators did you measure? What were the results?
- *Was the voucher designed to consider nutritional needs in how money was allocated in the food wallet?*
- What percentage of the cash do you think was actually spent on food by the beneficiaries? What were the other main uses, and did the usage change over time/or in different seasons?

### **Developmental impacts**

- Were any of your projects/project areas particularly impressive in terms of their results? At both household and community levels?
- In your opinion, why did these projects produced impressive results?
- Do you think any of your projects had disappointing results? Which projects, which aspects and why?
- To what extent has MBEP affected developmental impacts of your programs? (e.g., food security, savings groups, social capital, market functioning, linking to community banks)
- What were the main contributors to these impacts? What conditions were in place to enable this success?
- What recommendations do you have for future projects of this type? What complimentary activities would further bolster the results? (e.g., financial literacy trainings)
- What further research is needed?

## IDI: LIFE HISTORY INTERVIEW GUIDE

**Selection:** The interview team should develop a detailed profile of 1-2 individual beneficiaries at each site. The profile, or in-depth interviews (IDI), will give the recent history of the beneficiary and describe the impact of market-based assistance on their lives.

If a person has received both food and cash assistance, ask the person to compare the two types of assistance and the impact on their lives.

The different profiles should be selected for diversity in household status, access to infrastructure and services, ecological conditions, and engagement with formal and informal markets and financial institutions.<sup>13</sup>

**Outputs:** The outputs of the life history interview will be (1) a narrative of the respondent's life and (2) a life history map/infographic (see end of document for an example).

---

### Introduction, focus, and consent<sup>14</sup>

- When you arrive at the household, introduce yourself and the research.
  - Purpose of the research (learning about cash, food, voucher emergency assistance)
  - Explain our focus in as much depth as you need to – you want to understand changes in assets and well-being during their lives and why positive and negative changes happened. Explain to them that you will ask questions about five time periods in their lives: what has enabled them to improve their lives; if they have fallen back, why they have done this; if they were able to manage in the face of shocks, how were they able to do this.
- Obtain informed consent, i.e., ensure that the respondent agrees to take part in the interview
  - The interview will be anonymous: it will not include their name. Participants may choose to not answer a question. The interview team will respect the participant's request, move forward, and not repeat the question. Participants may end the interview at any time. (Please see consent form)
- You will take notes that you will share only with other members of the research team.
- You will write short stories from the interview, which will not contain their name.
- Information from this interview will be shared with the US Government for future policy development. This interview will not affect current food/cash assistance participants are receiving. We will change names to protect sensitive information.
- Ask permission to take a photograph. The photo (without their name) might be used in a report that will be publicly available.

### Getting started

- Write down interviewee's name, age, and gender and the interviewer's name
- Note individual's appearance and demeanor (happy, sad, anxious, etc.)
- Describe house and compound

---

<sup>13</sup> Adapted from Scott, L. and V. Diwakar. 2016. Ensuring Escapes From Poverty Are Sustained In Rural Bangladesh. USAID Report prepared by Overseas Development Institute (ODI) for ACIDI/VOCA with funding from USAID/E3's Leveraging Economic Opportunities (LEO) project. Washington, DC. July. Accessed from: <https://dl.orangedox.com/Transitory-escapes-Bangladesh-2016-n>

<sup>14</sup> Consent forms were completed for each interview.

[Note to researcher: This is a good time to locate the respondent on Y-axis of the life history diagram, attached.]

**Life history diagram:** The interviewer should explain the diagram, the time periods (see below), and the scale of positive and negative events. During the interview, draw the life history diagram with the interviewee, and ask the interviewee to indicate on the diagram the how good or bad events were and how events compare to others in terms of scale.

- Life periods are:
  - Childhood: 0–12 years
  - Youth: 13 years to marriage, start of own household, OR 20 years (whichever is relevant)
  - Young adulthood: Marriage, start of own household, OR 20–40 years
  - Late adulthood: 40 years – 60 years
  - Older age: 60 years +
  
- Ensure you identify well-being levels at these points:
  - Childhood
  - Just before start of own household/marriage
  - Just after start of own household/marriage
  - Now

\*Focus on the impact of market based assistance on their lives.

\*Need to establish benchmarks for high and low events.

### Childhood

– Approximately 0–12 years old

- When and where were you born?
- How would you rate your well-being during your childhood?
- What factors contributed to that level of well-being?
  - Probe: education, parents' livelihoods and assets, food security, siblings, shocks/stresses, access to services, general health...

### Youth

– Approximately 13 years to marriage (or 20 years old, whichever is more appropriate)

- How would you rate your well-being during your youth (age 13 to marriage/age 20)?
- What factors contributed to that level of well-being?
  - Probe: education, parents' livelihoods and assets, food security, siblings, shocks/stresses, access to services, general health...

Probing questions could include:

- When did you leave **school**?
  - Probe: if, when, and why respondent left school?
- Livelihoods: What livelihood activities did you engage in?
  - First job/enterprise/livelihood activity: What was it? Rank livelihood activities at this period of your life in terms of their importance to household income and food security (e.g., farming, livestock rearing, job, small enterprise, etc.)?
  - If you migrated away from the village, did you have a job before you went? How did you find this job? How did you send money back to your family?
  - If you started a non-farm enterprise, why did you decide to start this? If so, who and how did this work?
  - Describe **working conditions**/constraints/profitability/shocks/risks/coping strategies associated with the different livelihoods activities.
- Any **credit**/loans taken out? For what? Largest amount? Ever taken loans to repay loans?

- Any participation or engagement in **social safety nets**? How important is this for your household? When/ in what event has it been especially important?
- Looking back at your life, are there any **positive or difficult events** that stand out? (Use this to probe for opportunities, investments, and resilience.)
- **Assets** during youth and before marriage/starting own household: What assets did you have before starting your own household? How does this compare with assets during childhood? Account for changes in asset holdings – probe reasons for sales and main source of finance for purchases or main reasons for acquisitions and from whom.
- Key **relationships**: landlords, friends, employers, richer households, social networks, kinship networks, employment relations, cooperatives, and banks

## Now

- How would you rate your well-being now?
- What factors contributed to that level of well-being?
- What type(s) of food assistance (cash, and seed vouchers) have you received and how did it affect your life?
  - What would you do if you didn't cash/seed vouchers through this program?
  - How does the cash provided affect your life? Do you think providing cash is a good way to help people in this community? Is there anything you would change about the assistance system?
  - Preferences for a certain type of assistance - vouchers versus cash or food aid.

## Probing questions

- Marriage:
  - Are you married?
  - How did you meet your husband/wife?
  - Parent's/family's views of the match?
  - Was there a dowry? How much? Was all of it able to be paid? What was the source of the dowry and where did it go?
  - If moved to spouse's village – feelings about that/problems; setting up home; relationship with in-laws/ extended family/community; relationship with spouse
- Livelihoods:
  - Assets at marriage – livestock, agricultural implements, land, etc.
  - What livelihood activities do you engage in? Which are the most important assets for each particular activity?
  - For each livelihood activity given:
    - Describe the working conditions
    - Constraints
    - Profitability
    - Shocks
    - Risks and coping strategies associated with each livelihood activity.
  - If involved in crop agriculture, why are you farming? Which crops are you farming? Who owns the land on which you farm? If sharecropping/leasing, what are the arrangements of this? Is it easy to find land to sharecrop/lease here?
  - If have livestock, what type? Who owns the livestock? Which is the main contributor to your livelihood, crops or livestock?
  - Have price changes of agriculture goods or livestock (either inputs such as seeds or the sales price of crops) affected you? How?
  - What did you do to improve your livelihoods during these years?
  - Did you ever migrate? How did you get the good/better job if you did?
  - Social networks that helped you get jobs/work/improve your livelihood?
  - Any credit/loans taken out? For what? Largest amount? Ever taken loans to repay loans?
- Children:

- Make sure dates of births have been identified
- Any difficulty with births?
- How have you financed the education of your children?
- Remittances from older children/kin
- Health:
  - Health of interviewee and family?
  - Impact on household well-being?
  - Were there any periods of sickness? If so, who was sick, and where did you go for treatment? How much did it cost, and how did you find that money?
- Relationships
  - Ask about the relationships that have been important for building their livelihoods and for coping with shocks.
  - Key relationships: landlords, friends, employers, richer households, social networks, community leaders, kinship networks, employment relations, cooperatives, banks
- Any participation or engagement in social safety nets? How important is this for your household? When/in what event has it been especially important?

Looking back over your life, are there any positive or difficult events or periods that stand out? (Use this question to probe for shocks, coping strategies, channels of support [relatives, friends, NGOs, churches, moneylenders, etc.], changes in asset levels, and changes in livelihood strategies, resilience.)